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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of the Asian crisis on bank stocks across four Western countries
and six Asian countries. In the second half of 1997, Western banks experienced positive returns. In
contrast, East Asian bank indices incurred losses in excess of 60% in each of the crisis countries. Most of
this poor performance is explained by the exposure of the banks to general stock market movements in
their countries. Currency exposures affected banks adv rsely beyond their stock market impact only in
Indonesia and the Philippines. Except for the Korean program, IMF programs had little effect on bank
values. The announcement of the Korean program increased shareholder wealth at the U.S. banks with the
highest reported exposure in Korea by about 7% and had a f v rable effect on bank shareholder wealth
in all the countries in our sample but one. There is no evidence that the Korean IMF program had a positive
impact on banks without exposure to Korea and hence our results do not support the argument that such
programs reduce systemic risk.
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11. Introduction.
For most observers, banks have been at the heart of the Asian crisis. For instance,
Hamann (1999) states that "the Asian crisis differed from previous financial crises that created a
need for the IMF's assistance. It was rooted primarily in financial system vulnerabilities and
other structural weaknesses" (p. 9).  However, the reasons given for the importance of banks in
this crisis differ widely across observers. For some, currency crises led to banking crises in the
affected countries. With this view, banks had accumulated large currency exposures based on the
belief that there was little exchange rate risk. When exchange rates collapsed, they suffered large
losses on their currency exposures. For others, banks were one important contributing factor to
the Asian crisis. Asian local banks are accused of making too many unsound loans and moral
hazard is blamed for this behavior. Delhaise (1998) argues that "It was generally accepted before
the crisis that most banks would be rescued if they ran into trouble." (p. 35.) Western banks are
blamed for first lending too much and then for contributing to the credit crunch by lending too
little. For instance, Wolf states that the East Asian banking crisis was "promoted by over-
generous lending from financial institutions in advanced countries."1 The IMF and governmental
bailouts have been blamed for creating incentives for banks to take on too much risk, including
foreign exchange rate risk.2 As one observer puts it, "These bankers took the opportunity to make
very risky, profitable loans, knowing that if the loans went bad, the IMF or the U.S. government
would bail them out."3
These various views of the Asian crisis raise important questions: Did bank shareholders
get hurt because of the crisis? Did the crisis pose a threat to the banking systems in Western
                                   
1 Financial Times, Wednesday October 21, 1998, page 14.
2 In a recent paper, BurnsideEichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999) develop a theoretical model where implicit guarantees
make it advantageous for banks not to hedge foreign currency exposures arising from their financing.
2countries? Can exchange rate changes explain the performance of Asian banks? Did specific
events in the Asian crisis affect bank shareholders? How were banks affected by the
announcement of IMF programs? Did IMF programs have systematic benefits or did they help
only those banks with exposures in the countries benefiting from the programs? To examine
these questions, we examine the returns to bank shareholders from January 15, 1997, to July 15,
1998. Our examination uses Datastream banking indices for four Western countries (the U.S.,
France, Germany, and the U.K.) and for six Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand). We also investigate the returns of the three U.S. banks that took a
lead role in the renegotiations of Korean debt, namely the Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, and
JP Morgan.
We find that during our sample period shareholders of East Asian banks incurred
dramatic losses. For instance, an investor who had invested one dollar at the start of our sample
period in Korea's bank index would be left at the end of our sample period with 14.7 cents. An
investor who had invested one dollar in Indonesia's bank index would be left with 3.3 cents. The
story is very different for the Western banks. An investor who invested one dollar at the start of
our sample period in the U.S. bank index would have had $1.73 at the end of our sample period.
In contrast, an investment of one dollar in the U.S. market index at the start of our sample period
would have netted $1.54 at the end of our sample period. A simple explanation for why Western
banks were not affected more by the crisis is that their exposures were small enough that the
impact of the crisis was offset by good news in other parts of their businesses. With this
explanation, if the East Asian crisis mattered at all for Western banks, we should find that on
days of adverse events in East Asia, Western bank stocks should have performed poorly.
                                                                                                                      
3 The quote is from Chung Ho n Lee, president of the Korea America Economic Association, in "Economists blame
short-term loans for Asian crisis" by Louis Uchitelle, New Y rk Times, January 8, 1999.
3We then try to understand why the performance of East Asian bank common stocks
during our sample period is so poor. We regress dollar bank excess returns on stock market
excess returns, currency excess returns, and interest rate changes. Even though East Asian banks
perform poorly, banks in Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand do not have abnormal returns over the
period from July 1997 to the end of January 1997 once we account for the performance of their
national markets. An explanation advanced in the assessments of the Asian crisis is that banks
had large currency exposures because of their use of offshore funding. This view has led some to
argue that banks should be required to borrow and lend in the same currency.4 We investigate
this explanation by estimating exposures of bank indices to exchange rate changes. Our estimates
show that after taking into account market returns, currency returns do not seem to contribute to
the poor performance of East Asian banks except for Indonesia and the Philippines. This result
means that the currency crises did not have an impact on banks beyond their overall impact on
the economy, so that there was nothing unique about the exposure of banks to exchange rates.
Since Western banks performed well over our sample period and since East Asian banks
performed poorly, we try to understand the impact of the crisis by examining how bank stocks
were affected by various events of the crisis. Such an approach might allow us to find traces of
the crisis in the returns of Western banks that get swamped by positive news over our sample
period and to find which events can explain the poor performance of Asian banks. We select
events over the whole sample period that were important in the chronology of the Asian crisis
and investigate whether they are associated with significant abnormal returns for banks. We find
little evidence of important impacts of Asian crisis events on banks across countries with this
approach. We find only five event periods where we can reject the hypothesis that banks have
                                   
4 See Hall's comments in Furman and Stiglitz (1998), p.124.
4abnormal returns equal to zero across countries with a p-value of 0.05 or better. The only period
in 1997 corresponds to the announcement of the IMF program in Korea. The other periods are in
January 1998. One of these periods in 1998 coincides with the Peregrine debacl  and another
with the IMF agreement with Indonesia. The announcement of the IMF program in Korea had a
positive impact on banks across most countries, which is inconsistent with the view that bailouts
are fully anticipated. However, the impact of IMF actions for U.S. banks is large only for the
banks with the highest exposures. IMF actions therefore do not appear to have significant
systemic effects on Western banks. Rather, they simply ensure that banks with exposure are
more likely to be repaid without benefiting banks that do not have exposures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our data and discuss the
returns of banks over our sample period. We explore the exposures of banks to exchange rates
and interest rates, as well as the exposure of Western banks to East Asia. In Section 3, we
consider the returns of banks over key events during the Asian crisis. In Section 4, we investigate
the returns of individual American banks. We conclude in Section 5.
Section 2. Bank returns over the sample period.
We consider a sample period that starts on January 15, 1997, and ends on July 15, 1998.
This period of exactly eighteen months includes all the important events of the Asian crisis. The
data we use consists of the historical Datastream retail banking and market indices for the sample
countries.5 The Datastream industry indices are produced according to the same criteria across
countries and are therefore comparable. These indices are value-weighted. They are not
comprehensive and are composed of the larger firms. Throughout the study, we also use data on
5exchange rates and on interest rates. Table 1 provides a summary of the data we use. Figure 1
shows the evolution of the banking indices in dollars during our sample period.
The lesson from Table 1 is that Western banks did well during our sample period while
Asian banks performed poorly. For all Western countries, the average returns on the banking
indices in excess of the risk-free rate were positive during our sample period. Furthermore, for
these countries, the average returns on the banking indices exceeded the average returns on the
country indices. The bottom line from this is that there is no evidence that the Asian crisis
affected the Western banks in a way that their shareholders would have suffered. The opposite is
the case for the banks in the East Asian countries. In these countries, the average returns of the
banking indices were negative and were lower than the returns of the market indices. Japan was
not a crisis country, but Japanese banks had negative returns lower than the negative returns of
the Japanese market during our sample period. Consequently, the experience of Japanese banks
was more similar to the experience of banks in crisis countries than it was to the experience of
banks in Western countries.
 Exposures of developed country banks to Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were
$90 billion for European Union banks, $20 billion for U.S. banks, and $85 billion for Japanese
banks at the end of 1997.6 Roughly half the exposures were short-term loans in the middle of
1997. The total assets of the banks from the U.S., the European Union, and Japan in the middle
of 1997 as reported by the IMF were of the order of $20 trillion. Exposures to the crisis countries
were therefore less than 1% of assets. In terms of capital, Japanese banks had the highest
exposures, which raises the question we attempt to answer later of whether their poor
                                                                                                                      
5  Datastream has two different series of sector indices. One series is recalculated as index components chang and
the other series is not recalculated. The series that are not recalculated used here have neither a survival bias nor a
backfilling bias over our sample period.
6 See IMF (1998), pp. 134-135.
6performance during the crisis can be explained by the fact that they had higher exposures than
the Western banks. Some estimates show that the exposure to Asian emerging markets for
Japanese banks was in excess of their capital. In contrast, the exposure of U.S. banks to Asian
emerging markets was about 30% of capital in the middle of 1997. This was less than for
German banks (60%) or French banks (45%). Another way to evaluate these exposures is as
fractions of the market value of the equity of the banks that form the Datastream indices. From
this perspective, a complete loss of the loans from U.S. banks to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand existing at the end of June 1997 would have amounted to a loss of less than 4% of the
market value of the equity of all the U.S. banks that belong to the Datastre mindex of retail
banks. For the European Union banks, the loss would have been less than one-fourth of their
equity value.  Finally, it would have been less than one-sixth of the equity value of the Japanese
banks. Obviously, a total loss of the loans was never a possibility, so our exposure estimates
provide upper bounds of the losses if the banks' exposures arise only from loans. It is important
to note that all these exposures are computed using loans only. For banks, off-balance sheet
exposures have grown dramatically. There is no data on the off-balance sheet exposures of banks
to the crisis countries. However, some banks made large losses on derivatives whose
counterparties were in crisis countries.
The returns of the Asian banking indices were dramatically different from the returns of
Western banking indices. For all Asian countries, including Japan, banking indices had negative
daily average returns as shown in Table 1 so that their shareholders experienced losses. These
losses were particularly substantial for the crisis countries and exceeded the losses on the market
index in Asian countries. Panel B of Table 1 compares total losses of the indices for the five
crisis countries. In all cases, the losses were devastating. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the
                                                                                                                      
7bank and market indices for these countries. There is little evidence of a fall in bank stock prices
relative to the market index in the first six months of 1997 except for Korea. In all other
countries, bank stocks collapsed when the market collapsed.
Looking at Figure 2, it is hard to make the case that there was a bank crisis unfolding
before the currency crisis starting from the middle of 1997. This suggests that the poor
performance of banks should be due to the currency collapse and to the deterioration of
expectations about future economic activity that accompanied the collapse. There could be at
least three reasons for this. First, the profits of banks increase with the level of economic activity
so that bank stocks suffer when news indicates that economic growth will be lower. Second,
banks were holding marketable securities and this exposure increased before the crisis (see
World Bank (1998), p. 40). The value of these marketable securities would fall as the stock
market falls. Third, banks are exposed to exchange rate changes because of their activities, so
that they make losses if they have net short positions in foreign currencies when their country's
currency collapses.
Banks used offshore financing extensively. This offshore financing was generally short-
term and dollar-denominated. The banks would then turn around and make domestic loans.
When domestic loans were denominated in local currency, banks would bear currency risk
directly. Since local interest rates were generally higher than offshore rates, being long in the
domestic currency and short the foreign currency could be highly profitable as long as exchange
rates remained relatively stable. The apparently large exposures resulting from this practice have
been blamed for the banks' problems. For instance, the World Bank (1998) states that "The
organizational design and special incentives of Thailand's Bangkok International Banking
Facility (BIBF) contributed, to a great degree, to Thailand's crisis." (p.35). If loans financed in
8foreign currency were also denominated in foreign currency, banks still had an indirect foreign
currency exposure despite having long and short positions in foreign currency because large
currency changes made it less likely that borrowers would repay their loans.
Bank balance sheets offer a poor measure of the bank's exchange rate exposures.7 They
do not tell us whether exchange rates affect banks through fee-generating businesses. They
ignore option features in loan contracts that affect currency exposures, such as call provisions.
Further, banks have many off-balance sheet derivatives positions, some of which are designed to
hedge balance sheet exposures. We therefore focus directly on measures of the exchange rate
exposures of banks obtained from equity returns. To obtain such measures, we egress bank
index returns on returns of foreign currency positions in Table 2. We use dollar returns for all
countries to make our results comparable.
To understand whether there was something unique about bank foreign exchange
exposures, we have to account for the impact of foreign exchange shocks on aggregate economic
activity. Since stock prices are forward-looking, we have to take into account changes in
expected future economic activity when the market participants learn about such changes. The
return to a country's stock market provides a forward-looking measure of changes in expected
future economic activity. We therefore account for shocks to aggregate economic activity
through the exposure of banks to their country's stock market and use the dollar excess return of
the local stock market as a control variable. Given the importance that Eichengreen and Rose
(1997) as well as others attribute to changes in interest rates in the U.S. in banking crises, we
include as our explanatory variables changes in the U.S. interest rate as well as changes in the
                                   
7 Burnside , Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999) review the data sources and the evidence on exposure of emerging
market banks. They point out that "Given data limitations, it is not possible to precisely measure the extent to which
large net foreign asset positions were hedged in the different crisis countries." (p. 7).
9U.S.-yen interest rate spread. The interest rates used are Euro-rates with a seven-day maturity
obtained from Datastream. A foreign exchange rate excess return is defined as the dollar return
on a risk-free investment in that currency over the return on a risk-free investment in the U.S.
For the exchange rate excess returns, we use exchange rate returns in dollars for the crisis
currencies as well as those of the Western countries and of Japan. We include the Western
currencies in our regressions since banks could have exposures to these currencies through their
borrowings from banks in these countries. We assume that a risk-free investment in a country
earns the shortest maturity money market rate in that country that we can get from Datastream.
Because of the time-zone differences between Asia and the Western countries, it is important to
use both contemporaneous and lagged variables for the Western variables. Remember that the
Asian markets for day t+1 are already closed when the Western markets open for the same day.
This means that changes in these variables that take place during trading hours in the West
cannot be incorporated in the Asian share prices on day t+1. In contrast, changes that took place
on day t during trading hours in the West can only be incorporated in Asia during day t+1. The
period with the most dramatic changes in stock markets and exchange rates is the period from the
Thai baht devaluation on July 2, 1997, through the end of January 1998. We define this period as
the crisis period and allow the exposures to differ from the Thai baht devaluation to the nd of
January 1998.  The regressions we reproduce are estimated with a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) specification that allows for contemporaneous correlation across ten countries.8
We examined the robustness of our results using other regression specifications. In particular, we
estimated the regressions using ordinary least squares and forcing the exposures to be constant
                                   
8 We use the same data source and same regression specification as Dewenter and Hess (1998), but we use daily
returns because of our focus on the Asian crisis.
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over the whole sample period. Our conclusions are not altered if we use these different
specifications.
The results in Table 2 are striking. The intercept estimates are insignificant across all ten
countries, and similarly for their crisis dummies except for Malaysia and the Phil ppines.  This
indicates, together with the high adjusted R-squares, that our explanatory variables describe the
bank excess returns quite well. However, the explanatory variable that is the most important in
explaining bank excess returns is the excess return on the stock market index of the country in
which banks are located. The coefficient on this variable, 0b , s significant in all countries. It
exceeds one for all Western bank indices.9  This means that in general a 1% return on the market
index implies a return on the bank index in excess of 1%. Since Western stock markets
performed well during the period we consider, the high0b  coefficient implies that Western
banks should have outperformed their respective stock markets. Japanese banks also have an
exposure to the local market that exceeds one. In that case, however, the market did poorly, so
Japanese banks would be expected to perform worse than the Japanese stock market, which they
did. Note however that during the crisis period, the intercept for Japanese banks is higher but not
significantly so. It does not seem, therefore, that the crisis contributed to the poor performance of
Japanese banks directly. Turning next to the crisis countries, all countries have significant market
exposures. We allow for the market exposure to differ during the crisis period, so that 10 bb +
provides us with an estimate of the relation between the market return and the bank index return
during the crisis period. The F-tests for the sum f 0b  and 1b  in Panel B of Table 2 show that
the total coefficient on the market during the crisis period significantly exceeds one in Thailand
                                   
9 Dewenter and Hess (1998) estimate regressions using the same Datastream indices for banks in a number of
countries using monthly data from January 1984 to March 1996.  They find coefficients on the domestic market that
are comparable to ours.
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and Malaysia, is about one in Korea and Indonesia, and is significantly lower than one in the
Philippines.  Based on these coefficients, one would expect banks to perform poorly in all the
crisis countries, but to underperform the market only in Thailand and Malaysia.
There is a large literature that examines the currency exposure of firms in Western
countries. The surprising result of this literature is that exchange rate exposures are small and
often insignificant.10 As discussed above, however, there are good reasons to think that exchange
rate exposures for Asian banks might have been quite large and could have played an important
role in their problems. The returns in our regressions are measured in dollars. The coefficient that
measures the exposures of the dollar return of banks to their own currency is 12,0g . Our
regressions include the dollar return on the stock market index of the bank's country.
Consequently, a fall in the market index in dollars caused by a fall in the dollar value of the local
currency affects the bank return in dollars through the local stock market exposure of the bank.
The currency exposures therefore measure the impact on dollar bank returns of changes in the
exchange rate that cannot be explained by the impact of changes in the exchange rate on the
dollar return of their local market. As a result, if a change in the dollar value of the local
currency has no impact on the local currency value of the stock market index and no impact on
the local currency value of the bank index, the exposure coefficient would be zero. A positive
exposure coefficient means that an appreciation of the local currency has a positive effect on the
dollar return of a bank in addition to its impact through its effect on the dollar return of the stock
market in the bank's country.
For Western banks, the exposures to the exchange rates of Western countries, as
measured by coefficients in rows (3) through (5) of Table 2, are generally insignificant. There
                                   
10 See Griffin and Stulz (1999) for a study of exchange rate exposures for developed countries that uses the
Datastream indices and provides further references to the literature.
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are only two exceptions. First, British banks are hurt by an appreciation of the pound for the
whole sample period, in that their exposure coefficient on the excess return of the pound in
dollars, 1,0g , is significantly negative. German banks appear to have a large negative coefficient
for the DM excess return, 2,1g , during the crisis period. Turning to the crisis countries, we find
that the own-currency exposures as measured by 12,0g  are insignificant for Korea and the
Philippines. They are significantly positive for Indonesia and Thailand, but significantly negative
for Malaysia. The exposure coefficient for Indonesia is large, 0.717, while the other exposure
coefficients are less than 0.2 in absolute value. The way to understand the coefficient on the
own-currency return for Indonesian banks is that a 1% depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah
leads to a decrease in the value of the Indonesian bank stock index relative to the Indonesian
stock market index of 0.717%. Griffin and Stulz (1999) report evidence on exchange rate
exposure coefficients for more than 300 industries in developed economies and never find
coefficients that large in absolute value. However, we cannot conclude from this that foreign
exchange depreciation explains the poor performance of banks in Indonesia and Thailand.
Remember that we allow the exposures to differ during the crisis period from July to the end of
January. Hence, to find out the impact of the depreciation, we have to add the two exposure
coefficients, 12,0g  and 12,1g . For Indonesia, we have a positive exposure for the whole period and
during the crisis period. Hence, a depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah has an adverse effect on
Indonesian banks controlling for the return of the Indonesian market in dollars. Paradoxically,
however, the currency exposure coefficient is significantly lower during the crisis period, so that
during the crisis a 1% depreciation of the rupiah leads to an abnormal return of 0.321% for
Indonesian banks. The exposure of Philippine banks during the crisis is also significantly
positive, but the coefficient is 0.127, so that a 1% depreciation of the Philippine peso leads to an
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abnormal return of Philippine banks of 0.127%. For Thailand, the exposure to the Thai baht of
the banks is negative during the crisis period. In other words, exchange rate exposure helped
rather than hurt Thai banks during the crisis period. This result is surprising in that Thai banks
are generally viewed as a key example of banks using short-term foreign currency financing. In
the case of Malaysia, the exposure is negative as well. This is consistent with the view expressed
by Furman and Stiglitz (1999) that foreign exchange exposures of banks in Malaysia were low
because of government policies.11 It follows from our analysis that the only countries where
foreign exchange movements can help explain why banks performed worse than their local
market are Indonesia and the Philippines.
From our analysis, there is no support for the view that currency movements were
consistently important determinants of the performance of banks in the crisis countries once one
takes into account the stock market returns in these countries. Given the many statements made
about the importance of the currency exposures for the East Asian banks, our results are
surprising. Note that these results do not mean that currency movements were not important for
banks. Since we do not attempt to explain the stock market returns, our analysis does not exclude
the hypothetical case where currency movements would explain all of the stock market collapse
and hence all of the bank stock price collapse. What our returns say is that there was nothing
special about bank foreign exchange exposures during the crisis period in that bank performance
is explained by the market's performance and that currency returns add little if anything to that
explanation.  To understand why we might reach a conclusion about bank exposures that differs
from conventional wisdom, it is important to remember that balance sheet exposures are only
part of the story when one is evaluating currency exposures of banks. Short of knowing all the
                                   
11 See Furman and Stiglitz (1999), p. 97.
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derivatives positions of a bank as well as its balance sheet exposure, one cannot accurately assess
that bank's currency exposure.
Some have argued that we do not find much of a role for currency changes on banks beyond their
impact on aggregate economic activity as measured by the stock market because the capital
markets were inefficient and did not correctly incorporate the impact of currency changes in
bank values. For instance, one view is that investors could not possibly know what these
exposures were on a day-to-day basis. We address this issue in several ways. Using daily returns
as we do in the regressions reported here opens the possibility that pricing mistakes or slow
adjustment could explain the low currency exposures. To check this, we estimated regressions
with leads and lags of exchange rate returns as well as regressions using weekly returns. We also
estimated regressions allowing for nonlinear effects of exchange rate changes and regressions
where the only explanatory variables were market returns and exchange rate changes. None of
these additional regressions change our conclusions. It is possible that the currency collapses
created large losses for banks, but the market expected these losses to be made up through
bailouts. In this case, currency exposures would create accounting losses but not equity value
losses. Without accounting data for the banks in our sample, we cannot explore this possibility.
A final difficulty with our estimates is that we had changes in exchange rate regimes for
the crisis countries. Up to some date, the exchange rate was pegged. After that date, the country
has a floating exchange rate. As a result, we could do a poor job of capturing exchange rate
effects because our sample period incorporates a period where the exchange rate fluctuates little.
If this was an explanation for our results, then the estimates of foreign exchange exposures for
Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia during the crisis period should be estimated precisely
because for these countries the crisis period corresponds to a floating exchange rate period.
15
However, for Thailand and Malaysia we do not find significant positive foreign exchange
exposures during the crisis period. In the next section, we also find that measuring exposures
during days of sharp exchange rate changes does not alter our conclusions either.
Our approach assumes that the market return captures common effects of exchange rate
shocks across industries. Since banks are part of the market index, our procedure would
underestimate the impact of exchange rate shocks on banks if exchange rate shocks do not have a
pervasive effect across industries but mostly have an effect on banks and if banks have a
nontrivial weight in the market index. The reason for this is that part of the bank-specific effect
of exchange rates would be captured by the market return because banks are part of the market.
The weights of banks in the D ta tream country indices at the start of our sample period go from
3.26% for Indonesia to 35.28% for Thailand. This means that if the exchange rate shocks had no
impact outside of banks, we would understate the impact of exchange rate shocks on banks
substantially in the case of Thailand. However, in the case of Thailand, we find that banks
benefited from depreciation of the local currency so that the bias discussed here would make our
results even more surprising. In the case of Korea, the weight of banks in the index is 12.47%.
This weight is 14.45% in the case of Malaysia and 23.23% in the case of the Philippines. For
these countries, therefore, the bias in our estimates would be small in the unlikely event where
exchange rate shocks have no common effects across industries and would not be large enough
to alter our conclusions.
In Table 2, we also allow for an impact of interest rate changes on the equity of banks.
The coefficients on changes in the Euro-dollar rate, 5,0g  and 5,1g  are insignificant for banks in
all countries. The coefficients on the dollar-yen interest rate spread,6,0g  and 6,1g  are
insignificant in all countries except for U.S. banks. This suggests that the banking crisis in East
16
Asia is atypical, in that it cannot be attributed to interest rate changes in developed countries in
contrast to the evidence reported by Ei hengreen and Rose (1997) who argue that high interest
rates in developed countries are generally strongly associated with the onset of banking crises.
Section 3. The returns of bank indices around crisis events.
In this section, we evaluate the returns of bank indices around crisis events. To do that,
we estimate the regressions of Table 2 without the crisis dummy for the intercept but with
dummy variables that capture the returns of bank indices around crisis events that cannot be
explained by the independent variables used in Table 2. This means that we estimate the impact
of crisis events on the return of bank indices net of the impact of foreign exchange changes,
interest rate changes, and domestic market returns. Table 3 shows the estimates for the various
events of the crisis, which are again obtained using the seemingly-unrelated regressions (SUR)
specification. The traditional event study approach in finance uses only the market return as the
independent variable. However, here we wanted to make sure that we understood the extent to
which events affect returns in addition to the change in other variables. Admittedly, there is some
arbitrariness in how one selects event windows in a study like this one. A difficulty with defining
event windows is that it is not always clear when an event takes place. For instance, an event
taking place on day t in the U.S. gets incorporated in stock prices in Korea on day t+1. Also, an
event could take place at date t in Korea, but only be announced after the market closes so that it
shows up in stock returns at date t in the U.S. and date t+1 in Korea. We therefore extend our
event windows to make sure that they include enough days to allow for differences in time
zones. The event windows we use in our estimation are described in the Appendix. We also
investigate abnormal returns for individual days.
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Our approach consists of estimating the abnormal returns of bank indices during periods
corresponding to important events in the Asian crisis. We perform this estimation for ten bank
indices. The problem with such an approach is that during the periods we focus on, other events
could affect bank indices besides those of the Asian crisis. Hence, we could find significant
abnormal returns that have nothing to do with events of the Asian crisis. Further, it could be that
most of the information about the crisis is too small to have much of an impact on stock prices,
even though the cumulative impact of events might be significant. Cornell and Shapiro (1985)
studied the impact of the debt crisis of the 1980s on stock prices and found that they could not
identify days that had significant impacts on stock prices. Yet, when they looked at yearly
returns, they found that the performance of banks was related to their exposure. We could also
fail to find significant abnormal returns because of insufficient power in our tests. Table 1 shows
that the volatility of stock returns differs across countries and is large among the crisis countries.
This means that abnormal returns of same size could be significant in one country but not in
another and that  abnormal returns that are economically significant might not be statistically
significant.
Another study investigates returns on specific days for the Asian cr s s. Kaminsky and
Schmukler (1998) look at days with large market returns and then investigate whether these large
returns can be explained by contemporaneous events. They find that agreements with
international organizations are generally contemporaneous with large returns. However, their
study focuses on market returns. In contrast, our study focuses on abnormal returns of banks.
Further, we investigate abnormal returns on important dates of the Asian crisis whereas they
select the dates based on market returns. Their approach is different because they seek the
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answer to the question of whether markets were acting rationally whereas we try to understand
whether specific events had an economic impact.
Rather than considering a chronology of events, we discuss first the impact on banks of
the initial event in each country where the central bank gives up on defending the existing
exchange rate regime and lets the exchange rate drop substantially. We then turn to events
associated with IMF programs.
3.1. The currency devaluations. For Th ila d, the initial devaluation was announced on
July 2. We therefore consider a window from July 1 to July 3. Table 3 shows that the abnormal
returns of banks in the U.K., France, Germany, and Japan were all less than 1% in absolute value
and insignificant. For the U.S., the abnormal return was 1.60%, but also insignificant. For the
crisis countries, the abnormal returns of banks were less than for the U.S. banks in absolute value
and are insignificant.
The Philippines abandoned their peg on July 11 and on July 14 the Malaysian central
bank abandoned the defense of the ringgit. We use an event window from July 11 to July 15. The
abnormal returns of the Western banks were trivial and insignificant, with the U.S. banks having
the highest abnormal return in absolute value at –1.57% with a p-value of 0.20. All Asian
countries except for Korea experienced positive abnormal returns. The highest abnormal returns
were for Malaysia and the Philippines. They were slightly above 2.7% for both countries but
insignificant. The problem is, however, that the currency events took place at the same time that
the IMF extended a program to help the Philippines on July 14, so that it could be that the
positive abnormal returns were due to the IMF program. Table 4 provides estimates of abnormal
returns on these individual days. If letting the currency fall has a positive effect on banks, we
should observe a positive abnormal return on banks in the Philippines on July 11 and a positive
19
abnormal return on banks in Malaysia on July 14. The abnormal return for the bank index in the
Philippines on July 11 was 1.81% with a p-value of 0.18, but it was –2.84% the preceding day
with a p-value of 0.01. The abnormal return for the bank index in Malaysia on July 14 was a
trivial 0.85%, but it was 2.32% on the following day with a p-value of 0.10. Based on this
evidence, there is no reason to suspect that these devaluations had s rong adverse impacts on
bank values.
The Indonesian rupiah plunged on August 14 after Indonesia gave up managing the
exchange rate. The story for the banks of developed countries is similar to what happened with
Thailand. For the U.K., France, Germany, and Japan the abnormal return of banks was less than
1% in absolute value. For the U.S. banks, the abnormal return was 1.74% with a p-value of 0.16
in Table 3. Banks in Indonesia had an insignificant abnormal return of 3.75%. The returns of the
banks of the other crisis countries were positive except for Korea where banks have a trivial
negative abnormal return. None of these abnormal returns are significant. From this, no case can
be made that this event had an adverse effect on banks in crisis countries once the impact on the
market and the exchange rate is taken into account.
The last currency to abandon its peg was the won on November 17. We estimate the
abnormal returns for a window from November 14 to November 18. Over that window, no bank
index in developed countries experienced an abnormal return greater than 1% in absolute value.
Korean banks had an insignificant abnormal return of –0.57%. The Indonesian banks lost 4.84%,
but the Thai banks gained 3.37% and the Malaysian banks gained 2.18%. None of the abnormal
returns are significant.
The last period of interest with respect to currency movements is the period of the
currency meltdown of late July that led Mahathir to blame "rogue speculators." We use an event
20
window from July 23 to July 29. This window starts with the ringgit reaching a 38-month low on
July 24 and ends when Thailand called the IMF on July 28. Malaysian banks did not have much
in the way of abnormal returns during this period. While French, US and Korean banks
experienced economically large abnormal returns, only the French bank index had a significant
positive abnormal return. Thai banks had a negative abnormal return of -2.53%, but this
abnormal return is not significant.
The bottom line from our analysis is that there is no evidence that banks performed
poorly during periods of large depreciations. One could even argue that these periods were
reasonably good for banks. This is especially clear for the U.S. banks that have a cumulative
abnormal return of 4.01% over the five events discussed above using the data in Table 3. Further,
all countries except for Indonesia and the U.K. also have positive cumulative abnormal returns
over these windows. The conclusions from our analysis do not change if we exclude exchange
rate changes as independent variables.
3.2. IMF programs. Except for Malaysia, all crisis countries received IMF programs.
The first program was the one for the Philippines. On July 14, the IMF offered almost $1.1
billion of financial support to the Philippines. As discussed earlier, we estimated a window from
July 11 to July 15 in Table 3. While the abnormal returns for Western banks are mixed, but small
in absolute value over that period, no bank index in Asia except for Korea had a negative
abnormal return during that period. Because this period was also one with exchange rate events,
we investigate the abnormal returns on July 14 in Table 5 which corresponds to the day of the
IMF program agreement for the Philippines. The announcement seems to leave no trace on
Western banks. However, Asian banks experience positive abnormal returns except for those of
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Korea and Indonesia. The only significant abnormal return is the one for Japanese banks, which
was 1.91% with a p-value of 0.06.
The next program was the one for Thailand. We have two different windows. The first
window is from August 4 to August 6. It captures the announcement of the austerity measures in
Thailand responding to the suggestions of the IMF. Abnormal returns for that event window are
small and insignificant at the 10% level for all bank indices except for a 1.95% abnormal return
for Japanese banks with a p-value of 0.05.  Thai banks earned an insignificant 0.13%. The
second event window covers the announcement of the program on August 11, so that it goes
from August 8 to August 12.  U.S. and Japanese banks had significant positive abnormal returns
on August 11. The banks in crisis countries had abnormal returns of less than 1% in absolute
value and all are insignificant.
A program for Indonesia was announced on October 31. We use a window from October
30 to November 3. During that window, all banking indices except those for Thailand, the
Philippines, and Japan have negative insignificant abnormal returns. Indonesian and Malaysian
banks experienced the biggest losses during that period and they slightly exceed 3%. Thai banks
experienced a large gain of 7.22%. French, German, and American banks lost between one and
2%. Japanese banks that had an exposure in excess of $20 billion in Indonesia had a small
insignificant positive abnormal return on the announcement day. American banks had a small
negative abnormal return. Indonesian banks lost an insignificant 1.05%. The hypothesis that the
abnormal returns across countries were equal to zero on October 31 is not rejected.
Following the announcement of the IMF program on October 31, Indonesi  had a number
of negotiations with the IMF leading to further agreements and clarifications. In particular, on
January 15, 1998, Suharto signed an agreement with the IMF. We look at three different
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windows in Table 3: From January 8 to January 12, from January 13 to January 14, and finally
from January 15 to January 16. For all these windows, we can reject the hypothesis that bank
abnormal returns are equal to zero across countries. During the first window, there were
substantial concerns about reaching an agreement between developed country banks and
Indonesian corporations. On January 9, the New York Times had a negative headline on
Indonesia. The Peregrine bank collapse on January 12 in Hong Kong was unrelated to the IMF
program in Indonesia. An equally-weighted portfolio of Western banks lost 2.83% with a p-value
of less than 0.01 during the first window (not reported in the table) and made small but positive
gains during the next two windows. U.S. banks lost 2.16% during the first period, which is
significant at the 10% level. Korean banks lost a dramatic 7.19%. Thai banks lost 7.86%.  In
contrast, Indonesian banks gained 8.76%.  During the window corresponding to the IMF
agreement announcement, the returns to Western banks were trivial, but Indonesian banks earned
18.17% on January 15 and 16 after having lost 14.56% on January 13 and 14. During March
1998, issues surrounding the IMF agreement with Indonesia were prominent. A meeting between
the IMF and Indonesia took place on March 21 after Indonesia gave up a plan of using a
currency board on March 20. U.S. banks lost a significant 1.62% during that window and
Indonesian banks lost 6.12% with a p-value of 0.12 from March 20 to March 23. A new
agreement between the IMF and Indonesia took place on April 8. No bank index had a
significant abnormal return for an event window from April 7 to April 9. All Asian banks except
for Malaysia and the Philippines had negative abnormal returns during this window, with Korean
banks losing 6.49% and Indonesian banks losing 2.36%.
Korea announced that it would seek help from the IMF on November 21. We consider an
event window from November 19 to November 24 (November 22 and 23 correspond to a
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weekend). Table 3 shows that this window has positive abnormal returns in five countries and
negative abnormal returns for the rest. Banks in Korea earned an insignificant 3.13% over that
window. Banks in the U.K. earned an abnormal return of –2.35% with a p-value of 0.12.
Looking at daily abnormal returns in Table 5 gives a clearer picture. On November 21, all
Western banks had insignificant abnormal returns of less than 0.6% in absolute value. Japanese
banks had a large significant abnormal return of 2.02% with a p-value of 0.04. Korean banks
made a significant gain of 4.39% on November 20 and an insignificant gain of 1.05% on
November 21. For November 24, we can reject the hypothesis that abnormal returns of banks
across the world were equal to zero with a p-value of 0.10. Malaysian and Thai banks all had
significant negative abnormal returns on that day at the 10% level.
The IMF program for Korea was accepted at the beginning of December. On December
1, an agreement was announced by Korea, but this collapsed the next day. A more definitive
agreement was announced on December 4. We therefore use two windows in Table 3. The first
one is from November 28 to December 2 and the second one is from December 3 to December 8.
All countries except for Malaysia and the Philippines had positive abnormal returns for the
second window, which is the one corresponding to the acceptance of the program. These
abnormal returns are significant with p-values of 0.05 or better in three countries: Germany had
an abnormal return of 4.97% with a p-value of 0.01, France had an abnormal return of 4.45%
with a p-value of 0.02, and Korea had an abnormal return of 12.50% with a p-value of less than
0.01. U.S. banks had an abnormal return of 1.88% with a p-value of 0.19. No country except for
the Philippines and Malaysia had an abnormal return of less than 1.6%. The results for the first
window are more mixed. The reason for this turns out to be straightforward. This window
includes both good news and bad news for the IMF program. A good approach to obtain an
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estimate for the U.S. is to look at New York Times h adlines. On December 1, the New York
Times had a front page headline stating that Korea had agreed to a huge bailout. The abnormal
return for the U.S. banks on that day is shown on Table 5 and was 2.03% with a p-value of less
than 0.01.
Section 4. The experience of U.S. banks with high exposures.
The general conclusion that emerges from the event study is that devaluations cannot
explain the poor performance of banks in Asia and generally, when IMF program
announcements convey information, that information is positive. We saw evidence that Western
banks were affected by events in Asia, especially the announcements related to the IMF program
in Korea. If we are correct in attributing the positive abnormal returns to the announcement of
IMF programs, it should be the case that banks with greater exposure should be affected more by
these events. We therefore investigate the experience of three U.S. banks: Chase, JP Morgan, and
Citicorp. We form an equally-weighted portfolio of these three banks and estimate the returns for
the event-windows discussed in the previous section. We also investigate Chase separately
because it had the largest exposures. In addition to the events of the previous section, we also
consider the earnings announcement events to evaluate the ability of the market to understand the
implications of the Asian events for the banks. If the market underestimated the impact of the
crisis on banks, earnings announcements would be informative.
4.1. Currency devaluations. T ble 6 shows that Chase earned 2.79% over the window
corresponding to the Thai baht devaluation on July 2 with a p-value of 0.26. The equally-
weighted portfolio of Chase, Citicorp and JP Morgan earned 2.38% with a p-value of 0.30. The
devaluation of the peso decreased the equally-weighted portfolio by slightly more than 2%.
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Interestingly, however, the loss was only 0.02% on the day of the devaluation. Chase then earned
3.78% when the rupiah devalued on August 14 with a p-value of 0.13. For that event, the
equally-weighted portfolio earned 2.66% with a p-value of 0.25. When the won devalued on
November 17, Chase lost 2.89% with a p-value of 0.24, while the equal y-weighted portfolio
falls by 1.65%. During the period of the dramatic fall in the ringgit (July 23-29), the equally-
weighted portfolio earned 2.62% with a p-value of 0.38. We estimated the cumulative abnormal
return associated with the days when it was announced that the five currencies would no longer
be defended. For Chase, these five days had a cumulative abnormal return of 5.09% from Table
6. For Citicorp, the abnormal return was 2.72%. Finally, for JP Morgan, the abnormal return was
3.94%. This evidence suggests therefore that the events corresponding to the abandonment of the
defense of parities and massive devaluations of the five currencies were positive events for the
three U.S. banks.
4.2. IMF announcements.  Table 7 shows that the Philippines program announced on
July 14 had no information for the equally-weight d portfolio. The banks had insignificant
positive abnormal returns at the announcement of the Thai program on August 11 and
insignificant negative abnormal returns at the announcement of the Indonesian program at the
end of October. On December 1, Chase earned 3.65% with a p-value of 0.01. It lost 0.96% on
December 2 when it looked like the IMF program was in trouble. It then earned 0.38% the next
day and 1.83% on December 4. To put things in perspective, the abnormal return of Chase on
December 1 was the highest abnormal return of Chase for the month of December 1997 and
January 1998. No other crisis event during that period had such an effect on Chase. The value-
weighted portfolio earned a highly significant 4.55% on December 1, lost 0.81% the next day
and gained 0.36% on December 3 and 3.27% on December 4 with a p-value of 0.02. In total, this
26
amounted to more than 7% of the market value of these three banks. Again, no other day during
December or January and no other event during our whole sample period has a higher abnormal
return for the equally-weighted portfolio than the abnormal return on December 1. One might be
concerned that other news explains the abnormal returns corresponding to the days discussed in
this paragraph. However, news published in newspapers cannot explain these abnormal returns.
The Wall Street Journal index had no news about Citicorp and Chase in early December.  It
had news about JP Morgan, namely the suspension of traders for possible price manipulation on
December 2 and a realignment of duties of high aides on December 5.
An important question is whether the announcement of the Korean IMF programs had a
general positive impact on banks because of a reduction in systemic risk or just affected
positively the banks with exposures in Korea. Table 7 makes it possible to answer that question.
In that table, we compute abnormal returns for two pieces of the Datastream U.S. retail banking
index. The first piece is the abnormal return on a value-weighted portfolio of the three banks
discussed in this section. The second piece is the value-weighted portfolio of the other banks in
the Datastream index. The abnormal return o  the banks that did not have much of an exposure
to Korea was insignificant and less than 1% for each announcement. Hence, there is a dramatic
difference in the impact of the announcements related to Korea's IMF program between the
banks with the highest exposure and the other banks in the Datastream index. This suggests that
the benefit of the program for banks is restricted to the banks with exposure. It is inconsistent
with the view that such programs are justified because of their benefit in reducing systemic risk.
4.3. Earnings announcements. An i portant question is whether the market correctly
interpreted the implications of the Asian crisis for the banks discussed in this section. On
December 10, 1997, JP Morgan warned that its earnings were hurt by the behavior of the
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markets. This pre-announcement of earnings had a strong effect on the three banks discussed in
this section. JP Morgan had a negative abnormal return of –3.18% on December 10 with a p-
value of 0.04 (not reported). Chase had a negative abnormal return of –3.49% on December 10
with a p-value of 0.02. Citicorp had an abnormal return of –4.62% with a p-value of 0.03 on
December 10 . The banks' earnings were affected by market turmoil that decreased their trading
income. When earnings were subsequently announced, however, they had no significant effects
on the stock price of these banks. The earnings pre-announcement of JP Morgan therefore
conveyed substantial information about the banks that was not available to investors beforehand.
Strikingly, however, this earnings pre-announcement did not have a significant impact on the
Datastream bank index for the U.S. On December 10, the abnormal return on that index was –
0.97% and insignificant.
The events in East Asia left little trace on the three banks when they announced their
earnings for the last quarter of 1997. On January 20, 1998, when JP Morgan announced it was
designating more than 10% of its exposures to South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand as non-
performing. At that time, analysts were interpreting this decision as a political decision made to
influence the bargaining process.12 The non-p rforming positions were primarily swaps rather
than loans. On January 26, Standard and Poor's placed JP Morgan on CreditWatch "to reflect the
possibility of a modest downgrade." The S&P analyst stated that "There are many reasons for
this. The south-east Asian situation on its own would not have justified this action." Asked
whether other banks would be downgraded, she added that "As long as the south-east Asian
                                   
12 See "JP Morgan redesignates Asia loans" by John Authers, Financial Times, January 21, 1998, London Edition,
p. 28.
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crisis remains isolated to those countries which have been given bail-outs by the International
Monetary Fund, there will be no need to downgrade US banks."13
Section 5. Conclusion.
In this paper, we examined the impact of the Asian crisis on the shareholder wealth of
Western and East Asian banks. Our main conclusions are as follows:
1) Equity investors in shares in East Asian banks made dramatic losses.
2) The impact of the crisis on Western banks in general was small and was not enough
to prevent these banks from outperforming their respective markets.
3) Though much attention has been paid to the dramatic loss in value of the East Asian
currencies and many have argued that this loss played a major role in the difficulties
of the banks in these countries, our evidence shows that changes in exchange rates
movements have no additional explanatory power for the performance of banks
beyond their impact on general market movements in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.
There was a direct impact of currency exposures on bank performance in the
Philippines and Indonesia.
4) We can reject the hypothesis that the initial currency collapses across East Asian
countries hurt U.S. banks. For instance, Chase Manhattan earned an abnormal return
of 5.09% across the five days when the East Asian countries announced that they
would no longer defend their peg.
                                   
13 See "S&P places JP Morgan on CreditWatch," by John Authers, Financial Times, January 27, 1998, USA
Edition, p. 26.
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5) In total, the IMF program announcements increased bank shareholder wealth. Of all
the events we consider, the IMF program announcement with Korea stands out. It is
one of five events where we find evidence that banks were significantly affected
across countries. Banks with the greatest exposure in the U.S. experienced significant
abnormal returns in excess of 7% from this announcement.
6) The IMF program in Korea benefited only those U.S. banks with large exposures in
Korea. No case can therefore be made that the IMF programs have the positive effect
of somehow reducing systemic risk.
Further research should investigate more closely why the currency collapses did not hurt bank
shareholder equity. There are three possible explanations worth considering. First, it could be
that banks were hedged more than commentators believe they were. Second, it could be that the
market expected currency losses to be offset by bailouts. Third, the market might have been
inefficient in incorporating information about exchange rate changes. We explored the third
hypothesis to some extent and found no support for it. Detailed accounting data would be
required to investigate the first two hypotheses.
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Appendix. Brief description of news announcements on selected event days
May 14-15, 1997 – Thailand’s currency is hit by a massive attack by speculators.
May 23 - Moves to save Finance One, Thailand’s largest f n ce company fails.
June 19 - Amnuay Viravan, staunchly against devaluing the baht, resigns as Thailand’s finance minister.
June 27 - The Thai central bank suspends operations of 16 cash-strapped fin nce companies.
June 30 - Thai Prime Minister Chavali  Yonchaiyudh assures that there willbe no devaluation of the baht.
July 2- The Bank of Thailand announces a managed float of the baht nd c lls on the IMF for technical assistance.
The announcement effectively devalues the baht by about 15-20% to 8.80 perdollar.  This is a trigger for
the East Asian crisis.
July 14- The IMF offers the Philippines almost $1.1 billion in financial support.  The Malaysian central bank
abandons the defense of the ringg t.
July 24 - The ringgit hits 38-month low of 2.6530 per do lar. Malaysian Prime M nister Mahathir Mohamad
launches bitter attack on “ ogue speculators.”
July 26- Malaysian Pr meMinister Mahathir names hedge fund manager George Soros as th  man esponsible for
the attack on the ringgit. He later brands Soros a “moron.”
July 28- Thailand calls in the IMF.
Aug. 5- Thailand unveils austerity plan and completes revamp of financesect r as part of an IMF rescue package.
Aug. 11 - The IMF unveils a rescue package for Thailand including loans totaling $16 billion.
Aug. 14 - Indonesia abolishes its system of managing the exchange rate through a band andllows it to float. The
rupiah plunges to 2,755 per dollar.  Bank Indonesia tries mopping up liquidity with high interest rates.
Aug. 20 - IMF approves a $3.9 billion credit for Thailand.  The package now totals $16.7 billion.
Sept. 20 - Mahathir tells delegates to the IMF/World Bank annual conference in Ho g Ko g that currency trading is
immoral nd should be stopped.
Sept. 21 - Soros says, “Dr. Mahathir is a menace to his own country.”
Oct. 8 - Indonesia says it will ask the IMF for financial assistance.
Oct. 31 - IMF gives Indonesia a $23 billion fi ancial support package.
Nov. 17 - South Korea abandoned its defense of the battered won.
Nov. 20 - Dashing any early hope for controlling its financial turmoil, South Korea’s cur ncy fel  10% in trading.
Nov. 21 - South Korea said it would seek a rescue package from the IMF.
Dec. 1 - South Korea and the IMF r sumed talks on a rescue pack ge after an initial deal floundered.
Dec. 4 - A record loan package led by the IMF to bail out South Korea helped calm jitters in most regional markets.
Dec. 5 - South Korea agreed to lower its economic growth to 3% in 1998 from a projected 6% underthe terms of its
IMF rescue package.
Dec. 15 - The IMFboard meeting in Washington con iders a Korean request to spe d delivery of a portion of the
$60 billion international bailou  a nounced Dec. 3.
Dec. 18 - Fed up with their economy’s freefall, voters in South Korea elec ed longtime dissident Kim, Dae-Jung as
president, leaving some concerned that the country’s financial markets will be further battered.
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Dec. 24 - The IMF said that it would make $2 billion av ilable to South Korea on Dec. 30 from the $21 billion set
aside for the financially troubled country.  The IMF plans to dole out another $2 billion to Seoul on Jan. 8.
Dec. 30 - The world’s major banks (key U.S. and German banks) prepared to join an eff rt to roll over a mountain
of short-term debt of South Korea due on D c. 31.  The effort is expected to help Kor a manage its
estimated $100 billion in short-term debt, of which $15 billion comes due by Dec. 31.
Jan. 2, 1998 - While major U.S. and European banks announced that they would allow South Korean customers
more time to pay ff the$15 billion short-term debt, several smaller banks are unwilling to do th  same.
Jan. 9 - Concern over Indonesia hit Asian stocks, but currencies won some support on hopes of an imminent deal
between U.S. banks and heavily indebted Indonesian companies.  A proposal for the South Korean
government to issue about  $25 billion in bonds won increased support at a meeting of international banks.
But several major banks were still hesitant about endorsing the plan, and the Korean governmen  indicating
it needs another week to make a decision.
Jan. 13 - The IMF and Indonesia appear to be near an greement over the IMF bailout.
Jan. 15 - Indonesia President Suharto announced wide-ranging economic reforms that, if carried out, w uld
overturn the country’sentrenched ways of doing business and curb its economic growth.
Jan. 29 - South Korean government and 13 lea ing international banks agreed that Korean banks can exchange their
short-term non-trade credits for new loans guaranteed by the Republic of Korea withmaturitiesof one, two
or three years, and with a floating rate of 2.25%, 2.5%, and 2.75% over the six-month LIBOR.
Feb. 16 - The rupiah dived through 10,000 in early trade in the wake of weekend repor s that the IMF had threatened
to withdraw assistance to Indonesia if it adopts a currency board.
Feb. 17 - President Suharto fired Indonesia’s central bank governor who have opposed government plans to create 
fixed exchange rate system for he rupiah through a currency board. The IMF, the United States, Germany
and Australia have all come out in opposition o such a board. T e IMF has threatened to withhold further
money under a $43 billion bailout package.  Separ tely, the IMF released a further $2 billion to South
Korea, bringing total IMF lending to about $15 billion so far out of its $21 billion rescue package agreed
last December.
Mar. 9 - A simmering dispute between the IMF and Indonesia cast a shadow over Pacific Rim markets, sending
some regional markets down and limiting gains in others.  Over the weekend news broke that the IMF
would delay the disbursement of funds to Indonesia.  The rupiah plunged to as low as 12,250 per dollar.
Mar. 21 - The IMF and the Indonesian government have made “considerable progress” toward a new deal to
counter the country’s grave economic crisis.
Mar. 26 - Indonesia said that it is close to a comprehensive package of measures to lift the coun ry out of its worst
economic crisis in three decades, which Indon ia has agreed to in exchange for a $40 billion bail ut
Apr. 8 - Indonesia said that it had reached agreement with the IMF on a new package of economic reforms and
targets, which the IMF would watch closely to ensure compliance.
33
Table 1. Summary statistics (in percent) of daily equity excess returns and FX excess returns
for the period from Jan. 15, 1997 to July 15, 1998 (390 days)
Equity indices are from the Datastream Global indices, and their excess returns are calculated as logarithmic daily dollar returns
in excess of the one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit.  FX rates are also from the Datastream quoted by the Reuter, and
their excess return is calculated as the 1-day inter st ra e of that currency compounded by the FX rate change relative to the US
dollar, minus the 1-day r turn on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit.
Panel A. Summary statistics of variables used.
Variables Mean Std Dev MinimumMaximum
UK equity market index excess return0.080 0.801 -3.062 3.326
UK banking industry index excessreturn 0.090 1.459 -5.102 4.931
Germany equity market index excess return0.112 1.156 -5.453 4.397
Germany banking industry index excess return 0.143 1.528 -6.160 7.258
France equity market index excess return0.107 1.038 -3.879 4.954
French banking industry index excess return 0.175 1.550 -4.885 5.612
US equity market index excess return0.096 0.981 -6.839 4.284
US banking industry index excess return 0.126 1.315 -6.955 4.046
Japan equity market index excess return-0.076 1.616 -5.889 7.487
Japan banking industry index excess return -0.151 2.497 -8.664 12.066
Korea equity market index excess return-0.287 4.394 -21.753 26.896
Korea banking industry index excess eturn -0.507 4.886 -21.806 25.899
Indonesia equity market index excess return-0.539 5.682 -39.700 23.098
Indonesia banking industry index excessreturn -0.888 7.127 -36.973 33.026
Thailand equity market index excess return-0.406 3.583 -15.379 15.436
Thailand banking industry index excessreturn -0.476 4.309 -14.674 20.985
Malaysia equity market index excess return-0.416 3.351 -13.711 22.440
Malaysia banking industry index excessreturn -0.530 4.166 -13.339 30.178
Philippines equity market index excess return-0.290 2.462 -10.186 13.445
Philippines ba king industry index excessreturn -0.326 2.424 -10.329 13.773
Excess return on BP holding -0.002 0.492 -1.865 2.033
Excess return on DM holding -0.037 0.557 -2.064 2.030
Excess return on FF holding -0.035 0.547 -2.015 2.027
Excess return on JY holding -0.057 0.804 -3.013 4.354
Excess return on Korea Won holding-0.046 2.392 -12.717 21.968
Excess return on Indonesia Rupiah holding-0.276 4.224 -21.205 22.828
Excess return on Thailand Baht holding-0.071 1.557 -6.791 6.503
Excess return on Malaysia Ringgit holding-0.115 1.425 -6.548 6.713
Excess return on Philippines Peso holding-0.087 1.262 -11.850 3.867
D(Eurodollar) 0.09 1.491 -7.847 17.662
D(Eurod llar– Euroyen) 0.04 3.096 -15.626 19.268
Panel B. Holding period returns (%) on bank and market indices over the sample period
Period Index UK GermanyFrance US JapanKoreaIndonesiaTh ilandMalaysiaPhilippines
1/15/97 - 7/15/98Bank 50.84 85.25109.9573.22-41.19-85.30-96.67-83.44-86.56-70.27
Market 44.76 64.41 61.05 54.48-21.02-65.32-87.03-78.26-79.09-65.81
Difference 6.08 20.84 48.90 18.73-20.17-19.98-9.64 -5.18 -7.47 -4.45
7/2/97 - 1/30/98Bank 17.24 25.31 25.88 14.40-32.50-61.15-93.98-64.75-82.28-68.42
Market 14.19 5.20 7.78 10.13-24.34-51.99-82.63-54.39-68.05-58.58
Difference 3.05 20.11 18.11 4.27 -8.16 -9.16-11.35-10.36-14.23 -9.84
2/2/98 - 4/9/98Bank 15.10 16.96 42.32 20.52 -7.81-18.4243.10 19.12 65.08 49.25
Market 15.52 19.90 22.90 13.63 -3.46 -7.2336.55 13.91 34.53 29.57
Difference-0.42 -2.9419.41 6.89 -4.35-11.19 6.54 5.21 30.55 19.68
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Table 2. Estimates of the SUR model of banking industry excess returns on contemporaneous instruments
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for ten countries’ banking indust y i dices ov r the period from January 15, 1997 t  July 15, 1998 (390 days):
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where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on the Datastream banking industry indices for each of the ten countries, and mtR  is the corresponding sto k market index re urn.
Both returns are in excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eu odollar deposit.  td  is the interactive dummy for the Asian crisis period from 7/2/97 to 1/30/98. ktX  includes the
daily dollar excess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), the changes in the 7-day Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and Euroyen
rate, lags of the Western variables due to the time-zone difference, and daily dollar excess retu ns on each of the five Asian countries’ c rrencies (Korea Won, Indonesia Rupiah,
Thailand Baht, Malaysia Ringgit, Philippines Peso).  p-values are in brackets.  F-tests in Panel B are testing for the sum of the two coefficients for each variable.
Panel A. SUR estimates
Coefficient estimatesUK Germany France US Japan Korea Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaPhilippines
Adjusted R-sqrd (OLS) 0.739 0.681 0.627 0.724 0.845 0.789 0.844 0.894 0.894 0.797
(1)a0: Intercept -0.042[0.40]-0.033[0.57]0.013[0.84]0.006[0.90]-0.087[0.18]-0.279[0.06]-0.197[0.29]-0.041[0.67]0.133[0.14]0.036[0.61]
a1: Crisis dummy 0.018[0.82]0.124[0.18]0.087[0.38]0.011[0.88]0.095[0.36]0.146[0.54]-0.400[ .18]-0.064[0.67]-0.488[0.00]-0.272[0.02]
(2)b0: Own market excess ret 1.687[0.00]1.022[0.00]1.189[0.00]1.188[0.00]1.689[0.00]1.074[0.00]0.700[0.00]0.964[0.00]1.302[0.00]0.862[0.00]
b1: Crisis dummy -0.063[0.55]0.022[0.79]-0.050[ .60]-0.106[0.15]-0.143[0.10]-0.127[0.16]0.192[0.07]0.301[0.00]-0.108[0.09]-0.051[0.40]
(3)g0,1: Excess ret on BP -0.665[0.00]0.025[0.86]-0.005[0.98]-0.022[0.85]0.186[0.27]0.477[0.22]0.286[0.55]0.040[0.87]0.006[0.98]0.114[0.54]
g1,1: Crisis dummy 0.205[0.26]0.173[0.38]-0.105[0.63]-0.055[0.73]-0.060[ .79]-0.495[0.35]-0.451[0.49]0.132[0.69]0.137[0.66]-0.076[0.77]
(4)g0,2: Excess ret on DM -0.082[0.90]0.536[0.50]0.093[0.91]-0.677[0.28]-0.160[ .86]-1.629[0.43]0.084[0.97]1.176[0.37]-1.094[0.38]-0.914[0.37]
g1,2: Crisis dummy 0.464[0.73]-6.466[0.00]-1.024[0.55]-0.490[ .69]-0.431[0.82]1.225[0.77]0.903[0.87]-5.955[0.03]0.721[0.78]-1.582[0.45]
(5)g0,3: Excess ret on FF 0.184[0.79]-0.442[0.58]-0.026[0.98]0.599[0.35]0.293[0.75]1.807[0.40]0.446[0.87]-1.135[0.40]1.140[0.38]1.044[0.32]
g1,3: Crisis dummy -0.529[0.69]6.022[0.00]0.799[0.64]0.621[0.62]0.291[0.88]-1.356[0.75]-1.103[0.84]5.774[0.03]-0.891[0.73]1.424[0.50]
(6)g0,4: Excess ret on JY 0.051[0.44]0.052[0.50]-0.025[0.77]0.006[0.92]-0.743[0.00]-0.357[0.09]-0.389[0.14]-0.036[0.78]0.064[0.62]-0.123[0.24]
g1,4: Crisis dummy 0.033[0.77]0.000[1.00]0.096[0.49]-0.065[0.52]0.273[0.16]0.488[0.15]0.403[0.35]0.126[0.55]-0.232[0.27]0.588[0.00]
(7)g0,5: D(EuroU$) -0.001[0.99]0.040[0.52]0.035[0.61]0.043[0.39]0.026[0.73]-0.238[0.18]-0.176[0.42]0.068[0.54]-0.026[0.80]0.033[0.70]
g1,5: Crisis dummy 0.034[0.59]0.026[0.72]-0.034[0.67]-0.033[0.58]-0.072[0.43]0.325[0.11]0.239[0.35]-0.148[0.25]-0.161[0.19]-0.061[0.54]
(8)g0,6: D(EuroU$ - EuroYen) -0.008[0.79]-0.008[0.80]0.011[0.75]-0.063[0.02]-0.037[0.36]-0.085[0.35]-0.023[0.84]-0.011[0.84]0.038[0.48]0.011[0.80]
g1,6: Crisis dummy -0.003[0.93]-0.061[0.11]-0.022[0.60]0.060[0.05]0.072[0.12]-0.012[0.91]0.094[0.48]0.054[0.41]-0.047[0.46]0.009[0.86]
(9)g0,7: Lag of (3) -0.079[0.64]0.838[0.03]-0.459[0.34]0.100[0.67]0.216[0.35]-0.197[0.29]
g1,7: Crisis dummy 0.013[0.95]-1.249[0.02]0.585[0.36]0.444[0.17]-0.087[0.78]-0.025[0.92]
(10)g0,8: Lag of (4) 0.214[0.82]-1.691[0.42]1.735[0.51]1.284[0.33]-0.095[0.94]-0.225[0.82]
g1,8: Crisis dummy 1.510[0.41]1.145[0.78]-2.733[0.60]-1.384[0.60]-1.473[0.56]-2.612[0.19]
(11)g0,9: Lag of (5) 0.162[0.86]1.251[0.56]-2.485[0.36]-1.096[0.42]0.175[0.89]0.312[0.76]
g1,9: Crisis dummy -1.593[0.39]-0.533[0.90]2.839[0.59]1.004[0.71]1.114[0.66]2.568[0.21]
(12)g0,10: Lag of (7) 0.040[0.60]0.205[0.23]0.004[0.99]0.058[0.59]0.023[0.83]-0.040[ .63]
g1,10: Crisis dummy -0.063[0.47]-0.255[0.21]0.011[0.97]-0.112[0.37]-0.175[0.15]0.089[0.36]
(13)g0,11: Lag of (8) -0.006[0.88]-0.062[0.48]-0.057[0.61]-0.012[0.83]-0.011[0.83]0.030[0.49]
g1,11: Crisis dummy 0.052[0.25]0.089[0.39]0.107[0.41]0.036[0.58]0.066[0.29]-0.034[0.50]
(14)g0,12: Excess ret on own Curr. -0.092[0.61]0.717[0.00]0.188[0.04]-0.187[0.09]0.168[0.16]
g1,12: Crisis dummy 0.168[0.42]-0.396[0.01]-0.320[ .01]-0.087[0.56]-0.041[0.76]
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Table 2. (Continued)
Panel B. F-test statistics for the sum of the two coefficients for each variable
F(1, 3660) UK Germany France US Japan Korea Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaPhilippines
H0: a0 + a1 = 0 0.152[0.70]1.649[0.20]1.662[0.20]0.088[0.77]0.008[0.93]0.512[0.47]6.463[0.01]0.778[0.38]9.687[0.00]6.633[0.01]
H0: b0 = 1 88.420[ .00]0.128[0.72]9.215[0.00]12.320[ .00]109.068[0.00]1.320[0.25]14.128[0.00]0.807[0.37]36.754[0.00]8.544[0.00]
H0: b0  + b1 = 1 68.179[0.00]0.635[0.43]3.710[0.05]2.683[0.10]94.414[0.00]0.713[0.40]2.351[0.13]49.812[0.00]23.472[0.00]23.043[0.00]
H0: g0,1 + g1,1 = 0 14.450[ .00]2.218[0.14]0.571[0.45]0.537[0.46]0.675[0.41]0.003[0.96]0.141[0.71]0.612[0.43]0.455[0.50]0.051[0.82]
H0: g0,2 + g1,2 = 0 0.112[0.74]20.176[0.00]0.403[0.53]1.211[0.27]0.133[0.72]0.012[0.91]0.046[0.83]4.287[0.04]0.028[0.87]1.890[0.17]
H0: g0,3 + g1,3 = 0 0.090[0.76]17.476[0.00]0.271[0.60]1.300[0.25]0.127[0.72]0.015[0.90]0.020[0.89]3.946[0.05]0.012[0.91]1.809[0.18]
H0: g0,4 + g1,4 = 0 0.894[0.34]0.250[0.62]0.403[0.53]0.525[0.47]9.605[0.00]0.233[0.63]0.002[0.97]0.285[0.59]1.044[0.31]2.260[ .00]
H0: g0,5 + g1,5 = 0 1.065[0.30]3.027[0.08]0.000[0.99]0.109[0.74]0.959[0.33]0.661[0.42]0.226[0.63]1.500[0.22]8.559[0.00]0.297[0.59]
H0: g0,6 + g1,6 = 0 0.474[0.49]14.644[0.00]0.263[0.61]0.064[0.80]2.311[0.13]3.332[0.07]1.122[0.29]1.660[0.20]0.073[0.79]0.620[0.43]
H0: g0,7 + g1,7 = 0 0.192[0.66]1.442[0.23]0.087[0.77]6.309[0.01]0.380[0.54]1.785[0.18]
H0: g0,8 + g1,8 = 0 1.205[0.27]0.023[0.88]0.049[0.82]0.002[0.97]0.523[0.47]2.678[0.10]
H0: g0,9 + g1,9 = 0 0.824[0.36]0.040[0.84]0.006[0.94]0.002[0.97]0.351[0.55]2.736[0.10]
H0: g0,10 + g1,10 = 0 0.287[0.59]0.221[0.64]0.013[0.91]0.754[0.39]6.152[0.01]1.022[0.31]
H0: g0,11 + g1,11 = 0 3.788[0.05]0.242[0.62]0.560[0.45]0.529[0.47]2.833[0.09]0.029[0.87]
H0: g0,12 + g1,12 = 0 0.508[0.48]10.813[0.00]2.057[0.15]7.280[0.01]3.368[0.07]
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Table 3. Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of banking industry excess returns around news announcements
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for ten countries’ banking indust y i dices ov r the period from January 15, 1997 to July 15, 1998 (390 days):
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where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on the Datastream banking industry indices for each of the ten countries, and mtR  is the correspondi g stock market index return.
Both returns are in excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit. ktX  includ s the daily do lar xcess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), the
changes in the 7-day Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and Euroyen rate, lags of the Western variables due to the time-zone difference, and daily
dollar excess returns on each of the five Asian countries’ curr nc es (Korea Wo , Indonesia Rupiah, Thailand Baht, Malaysia Ringgit, Philippines Peso).  jtf  s a dummy variable
taking a value of 1/n for the j-th event days shown below, or zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate jD  represents a cumula ive abnormal return for the j-th event days. W
only reproduce the estimates of jD since heparameters estimates are similar to those of Table 2. P-values are in brackets.  F-tests in the last column are joint tests across 10
countries.
Estimates of CARs UK Germany France US Japan Korea Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaPhilippinesF(10,3445)
D1 (970514 – 970516: n =3) -0.112[0.93]1.319[0.39]0.322[0.85]-0.572[0.64]-1.920[ .27]-0.089[0.98]-2.155[0.65]0.635[0.80]1.339[0.58]-1.794[0.35]0.368[0.96]
D2 (970522 – 970526: n =3) 1.237[0.35]-0.532[0.73]0.747[0.65]0.421[0.73]1.299[0.46]5.983[0.14]2.351[0.63]-0.001[ .00]-3.546[0.15]2.499[0.20]0.842[0.59]
D3 (970618 – 970620: n =3) 2.661[0.04]-2.478[0.10]-2.167[0.19]0.498[0.68]1.407[0.42]-2.831[0.48]4.360[0.36]-4.286[0.09]-0.405[0.87]-1.873[0.33]1.582[0.11]
D4 (970626 – 970630: n =3) -0.468[0.72]-1.446[0.34]-1.842[0.26]-2.047[0.09]1.101[0.53]1.377[0.73]-1.214[0.80]-3.584[0.16]1.202[0.62]2.733[0.16]0.946[0.49]
D5 (970701 – 970703: n =3) -0.523[0.69]-0.689[0.65]-0.587[0.72]1.597[0.19]0.172[0.92]-0.160[ .97]-1.565[0.74]-0.476[0.86]0.036[0.99]0.281[0.88]0.240[0.99]
D6 (970711 – 970715: n =3) 0.619[0.64]1.236[0.42]-0.109[0.95]-1.571[0.20]2.173[0.22]-0.724[0.86]2.131[0.66]0.668[0.80]2.829[0.25]2.724[0.18]0.704[0.72]
D7 (970723 – 970729: n =5) -0.085[0.96]-0.704[0.72]5.504[0.01]2.117[0.18]-0.936[0.68]5.134[0.33]-0.125[0.98]-2.535[0.45]-0.375[0.91]1.838[0.47]1.151[0.32]
D8 (970804 – 970806: n =3) -0.352[0.79]-2.392[0.12]1.263[0.45]-0.391[0.75]4.735[0.01]1.853[0.65]-3.110[ .52]-0.536[0.84]-0.119[0.96]-1.246[0.52]1.197[0.29]
D9 (970808 – 970812: n =3) -1.397[0.29]2.818[0.07]0.505[0.76]0.180[0.88]1.551[0.38]-0.282[0.94]2.235[0.64]-0.770[ .77]0.598[0.81]-0.056[0.98]0.593[0.82]
D10 (970813 – 970815: n =3) 0.120[0.93]0.824[0.59]-0.251[0.88]1.743[0.16]-1.062[0.55]-0.204[0.96]3.747[0.44]2.199[0.40]0.051[0.98]1.100[0.57]0.434[0.93]
D11 (970819 – 970821: n =3) -0.447[0.73]2.233[0.14]-0.371[0.82]-0.731[0.55]2.533[0.15]0.158[0.97]-11.693[0.02]0.901[0.73]0.312[0.90]-1.799[0.35]1.157[0.32]
D12 (970919 – 970922: n =2) -0.967[0.36]1.488[0.23]0.851[0.53]-0.265[0.79]-0.528[0.71]1.152[0.73]0.783[0.84]-0.194[0.93]-1.493[0.46]-1.576[0.32]0.456[0.92]
D13 (971007 – 971009: n =3) -1.633[0.21]-0.493[0.75]1.695[0.30]-0.503[0.68]-1.420[ .41]2.873[0.47]-2.164[0.65]-3.899[0.13]-2.045[0.41]3.709[0.05]1.257[0.25]
D14 (971030 – 971103: n =3) -0.582[0.65]-1.317[0.39]-1.649[0.31]-1.485[0.22]0.733[0.67]-0.287[0.94]-3.299[0.49]6.962[0.01]-3.027[0.22]2.385[0.22]1.504[0.13]
D15 (971104 – 971106: n =3) -0.214[0.87]-0.276[0.86]-1.702[0.30]0.441[0.72]-3.151[0.07]-1.983[0.63]-0.432[0.93]0.418[0.87]0.325[0.89]-0.102[0.96]0.492[0.90]
D16 (971114 – 971118: n =3) -0.787[0.55]-0.567[0.71]0.052[0.97]0.122[0.92]-0.020[ .99]-0.572[0.89]-4.842[0.31]3.374[0.19]2.179[0.37]-0.819[0.67]0.422[0.94]
D17 (971119 – 971124: n =4) -2.350[ .12]-0.241[0.89]2.605[0.17]0.719[0.61]0.415[0.84]3.127[0.50]-0.344[0.95]-2.780[ .35]-3.869[0.17]1.056[0.63]0.881[0.55]
D18 (971128 – 971202: n =3) 1.934[0.14]-1.412[0.36]-1.293[0.43]2.036[0.10]0.814[0.64]-1.640[ .69]-2.045[0.67]-3.492[0.18]-2.589[0.29]-3.844[0.05]1.330[0.21]
D19 (971203 – 971208: n =4) 1.680[0.27]4.968[0.01]4.448[0.02]1.881[0.19]2.568[0.20]12.503[0.01]5.942[0.29]2.848[0.34]-0.154[0.96]-4.503[0.05]3.134[0.00]
D20 (971212 – 971216: n =3) 1.617[0.22]2.054[0.18]-0.311[0.85]0.081[0.95]2.470[0.16]6.289[0.13]-9.879[0.04]-1.159[0.66]0.768[0.75]1.766[0.38]1.489[0.14]
D21 (971217 – 971219: n =3) -0.380[ .78]2.303[0.14]-2.177[0.20]0.146[0.91]-1.286[0.48]0.159[0.97]-9.762[0.05]-3.153[0.24]-6.655[0.01]-1.218[0.54]1.610[0.10]
D22 (971223 – 971226: n =4) -0.214[0.89]-1.674[0.37]-3.072[0.13]-0.636[0.67]-1.091[0.65]0.156[0.98]3.747[0.57]0.179[0.96]4.301[0.20]1.843[0.49]0.538[0.86]
D23 (971229 – 971231: n =3) 0.087[0.95]-2.199[0.19]-1.092[0.54]-0.449[0.74]0.034[0.99]2.282[0.66]-6.059[0.32]-1.874[0.56]6.363[0.04]0.470[0.85]0.849[0.58]
D24 (980101 – 980105: n =3) -0.473[0.72]-2.474[0.11]0.156[0.92]-0.063[0.96]0.583[0.74]-0.765[0.85]1.439[0.77]-1.613[0.53]-4.080[ .10]-3.175[0.10]0.871[0.56]
D25 (980108 – 980112: n =3) -1.500[ .25]-3.162[0.04]-3.727[0.02]-2.163[0.08]0.399[0.82]-7.191[0.08]8.762[0.07]-7.855[0.00]-1.398[0.57]0.137[0.94]3.124[0.00]
D26 (980113 – 980114: n =2) 0.826[0.44]0.189[0.88]1.000[0.46]1.460[0.15]1.226[0.39]-4.001[0.23]-14.557[0.00]-0.611[0.77]-2.426[0.23]-1.425[0.37]1.939[0.04]
D27 (980115 – 980116: n =2) 0.824[0.44]-0.175[0.89]0.663[0.62]-0.009[0.99]0.199[0.89]-2.463[0.45]18.166[0.00]1.575[0.45]-1.614[0.42]-0.142[0.93]2.376[0.01]
D28 (980128 – 980130: n =3) 2.287[0.08]1.779[0.24]-0.055[0.97]-0.696[0.57]-0.139[0.94]0.804[0.84]-0.302[0.95]4.138[0.12]-0.034[0.99]-6.425[0.00]1.979[0.03]
D29 (980213 – 980218: n =4) 2.209[0.14]-1.576[0.37]1.045[0.58]-0.005[1.00]-1.025[0.61]-4.192[0.36]-1.738[0.75]-4.690[ .11]-1.428[0.61]-0.166[0.94]0.802[0.63]
D30 (980306 – 980310: n = ) -0.035[0.98]-2.409[0.11]1.105[0.50]-0.150[ .90]1.350[0.43]-1.713[0.67]1.493[0.75]0.154[0.95]-1.057[0.66]-1.353[0.48]0.520[0.88]
D31 (980320 – 980323: n =2) -1.570[ .14]0.482[0.70]-1.791[0.18]-1.615[0.10]-0.713[0.61]-0.324[0.92]-6.118[0.12]-1.467[0.48]1.303[0.51]0.056[0.97]0.989[0.45]
D32 (980325 – 980327: n = ) 0.524[0.69]2.927[0.05]2.930[0.07]-0.836[0.49]-2.124[0.22]0.051[0.99]6.632[0.17]2.420[0.34]-1.195[0.62]2.826[0.14]1.311[0.22]
D33 (980407 – 980409: n =3) 1.278[0.33]0.727[0.64]-0.414[0.80]-0.326[0.79]-1.089[0.53]-6.494[0.11]-2.360[ .62]-1.666[0.52]0.473[0.85]0.787[0.68]0.590[0.82]
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Table 4. Estimates of the abnormal returns (ARs) of banking industry excess returns on each day of the currency devaluations
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for ten countries’ banking indust y i dices ov r the period from January 15, 1997 to July 15, 1998 (390 days):
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where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on the Datastream banking industry indices for each of the ten countries, and mtR  is the correspondi g stock market index return.
Both returns are in excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit. ktX  includ s the daily do lar xcess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), the
changes in the 7-day Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and theEuroy n rate, lags of the Weste n vari bles due to the time-zone difference, and daily
dollar excess returns on each of the five Asian countries’ curr nc es (Korea Wo , Indonesia Rupiah, Thailand Baht, Malaysia Ringgit, Philippines Peso).  jtf  s a dummy variable
taking a value of one for the j- event day shown below, or zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate jD  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day.  We only
reproduce the estimates of jD since the parameters estimates are similar to those of Table 2. p-values are in brackets.  F-tests in the last column are joint tests across 10 coun ries.
Estimates of ARs UK Germany France US Japan Korea Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaPhilippinesF(10,3645)
 D1 (970701: Thailand–1) 0.555[0.46]-0.325[0.72]-1.076[0.26]0.869[0.21]0.152[0.88]-0.290[ .90]-0.563[0.84]0.306[0.84]-0.314[0.82]0.653[0.56]0.476[0.91]
D2 (970702: Thail nd  0) -0.872[0.24]1.001[0.26]0.993[0.30]0.420[0.55]-0.406[0.68]0.094[0.97]-0.254[0.93]0.138[0.93]-0.021[0.99]0.713[0.52]0.466[0.91]
D3 (970703: Thail nd +1) -0.416[0.59]-1.401[0.13]-0.503[0.61]0.304[0.67]0.435[0.67]0.157[0.95]-0.483[0.87]-0.795[0.62]0.649[0.65]-1.073[0.35]0.446[0.92]
D4 (97010: Philippines–1) -0.573[0.45]-0.194[0.83]0.160[0.87]0.254[0.72]-1.103[0.27]0.375[0.87]-3.114[0.28]-0.327[0.83]1.474[0.30]-2.841[0.01]1.115[0.35]
D5 (97011: Philippines  0) -0.317[0.67]1.710[0.06]-0.569[0.56]-0.116[0.87]-0.099[0.92]0.991[0.67]1.912[0.51]-0.603[0.69]-0.142[0.92]1.814[0.18]0.825[0.60]
D6 (97014: Malaysia  0) -0.517[0.49]-0.381[0.67]0.068[0.94]-0.498[0.48]1.903[0.06]-0.515[0.83]-2.806[0.33]1.158[0.45]0.845[0.56]1.224[0.28]0.831[0.60]
D7 (97015: Malaysia +1) 1.347[0.07]-0.048[0.96]0.372[0.70]-0.992[0.16]0.228[0.82]-1.324[0.57]3.468[0.23]0.276[0.85]2.321[0.10]0.668[0.56]1.007[0.44]
D8 (970813: Indonesia –1) 0.658[0.39]-0.253[0.78]0.544[0.58]0.661[0.35]0.284[0.78]-1.754[0.46]-0.543[0.85]1.528[0.32]0.622[0.66]-0.208[0.86]0.368[0.96]
D9 (970814: Indonesia  0) 0.354[0.64]0.804[0.38]-0.481[0.62]0.081[0.91]-1.481[0.15]2.653[0.26]1.706[0.56]-0.795[0.60]-0.126[0.93]0.415[0.72]0.562[0.85]
D10 (970815: Indonesia +1) -0.853[0.26]0.378[0.68]-0.145[0.88]1.081[0.13]0.349[0.73]-0.920[ .70]1.841[0.53]1.805[0.24]0.049[0.97]0.562[0.62]0.655[0.77]
D11 (971114: Korea –1) 0.055[0.94]-1.281[0.15]-0.010[ .99]-1.073[0.12]-0.275[0.78]1.037[0.65]-1.782[0.53]1.790[0.23]0.483[0.73]-0.419[0.71]0.815[0.61]
D12 (971117: Korea  0) -0.711[0.35]-0.027[0.98]-0.268[0.78]0.764[0.28]0.966[0.35]-1.543[0.51]1.818[0.53]0.163[0.91]0.108[0.94]-0.378[0.74]0.414[0.94]
D13 (971118: Korea +1) -0.219[0.77]0.720[0.42]0.248[0.80]0.432[0.54]-0.713[0.47]-0.287[0.90]-4.905[0.09]1.740[0.25]1.794[0.21]0.339[0.76]0.726[0.70]
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Table 5. Estimates of the abnormal returns (ARs) of banking industry excess returns on each day of the IMF program announcements
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for ten countries’ banking indust y i dices ov r the period from January 15, 1997 to July 15, 1998 (390 days):
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where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on the Datastream banking industry indices for each of the ten countries, and mtR  is the correspondi g stock market index return.
Both returns are in excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit. ktX  includ s the daily do lar xcess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), the
changes in the 7-day Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and Euroyen rate, lags of the Western variables due to the time-zone difference, and daily
dollar excess returns on each of the five Asian countries’ curr nc es (Korea Wo , Indonesia Rupiah, Thailand Baht, Malaysia Ringgit, Philippines Peso).  jtf  s a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate jD  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day.We only r produce
the estimates of jD since the parameters estimates are similar to those of Table 2. p-values are in brackets.  F-tests in the last column are joint tests across ten countries.
Estimates of Ars UK Germany France US Japan Korea Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaPhilippinesF(10,3465)
D1 (970711: Philippines –1) -0.266[0.72]1.727[0.05]-0.532[0.57]-0.053[0.94]0.012[0.99]0.799[0.72]1.895[0.49]-0.786[0.56]-0.165[0.90]1.757[0.19]0.808[0.62]
D2 (970714: Philippines  0)-0.492[0.51]-0.371[0.68]0.061[0.95]-0.452[0.51]1.912[0.06]-0.616[0.78]-3.044[0.27]1.074[0.43]0.960[0.48]1.163[0.30]0.860[0.57]
D3 (970715: Philippines +1)1.328[0.08]-0.075[0.93]0.376[0.69]-0.957[0.17]0.264[0.79]-1.177[0.60]3.533[0.20]0.186[0.89]2.242[0.10]0.607[0.59]1.022[0.42]
D4 (970804: Thailand –1) 0.411[0.58]-1.066[0.23]0.541[0.56]-0.287[0.68]1.153[0.24]1.149[0.60]-0.139[0.96]-0.353[0.79]0.800[0.55]-0.080[ .94]0.472[0.91]
D5 (970805: Thailand  0)-0.735[0.33]-0.562[0.53]-0.448[0.63]-0.635[0.36]1.951[0.05]-0.266[0.90]-0.809[0.77]0.132[0.92]0.600[0.66]-0.569[0.61]0.664[0.76]
D6 (970806: Thailand +1)-0.109[0.89]-0.825[0.36]0.924[0.33]0.487[0.49]1.350[0.18]0.695[0.76]-1.424[0.61]-0.577[0.67]-1.420[ .30]-0.491[0.67]0.601[0.81]
D7 (970808: Thailand –1) -1.218[0.11]1.845[0.04]0.282[0.77]-0.650[ .36]0.649[0.52]0.547[0.81]-1.135[0.68]-0.366[0.79]-0.458[0.74]-1.592[0.17]0.982[0.46]
D8 (970811: Thailand  0)0.674[0.37]0.179[0.84]0.421[0.65]1.140[0.10]1.698[0.09]-0.931[0.68]3.174[0.25]-0.081[0.95]-0.638[0.64]0.500[0.66]0.887[0.54]
D9 (970812: Thailand +1)-0.957[0.20]0.702[0.43]-0.302[0.75]-0.280[ .69]-0.771[0.44]-0.097[0.97]0.206[0.94]-0.281[0.83]1.260[0.35]0.500[0.66]0.446[0.92]
D10 (971030: Indonesia –1) -0.168[0.82]-0.464[0.60]-1.648[0.08]-0.929[0.18]-0.199[0.84]3.131[0.16]0.911[0.74]3.592[0.01]0.373[0.78]1.308[0.24]1.368[0.19]
D11 (971031: Indonesia  0)-1. 36[0.17]-0.110[ .90]-0.371[0.70]-0.190[ .79]0.751[0.45]2.434[0.28]-1.046[0.71]1.059[0.44]-3.716[0.01]0.106[0.93]1.300[0.22]
D12 (971103: Indonesia +1)0.571[0.44]-0.675[0.45]0.407[0.66]-0.336[0.63]0.281[0.78]-6.043[0.01]-2.951[0.29]2.571[0.06]0.205[0.88]0.899[0.43]1.528[0.12]
D13 (971119: Korea –2) 0.630[0.40]1.144[0.20]1.256[0.18]1.012[0.14]-0.178[0.86]-0.852[0.70]-0.088[0.97]-1.254[0.35]-1.752[0.19]1.471[0.19]1.101[0.36]
D14 (971120: Korea –1) -1.553[0.04]-0.518[0.56]0.222[0.81]0.000[1.00]-1.622[0.10]4.394[0.05]-1.099[0.69]1.272[0.34]3.752[0.01]-0.495[0.66]2.022[0.03]
D15 (971121: Korea  0)-0.580[ .44]-0.381[0.67]0.237[0.80]-0.422[0.54]2.015[0.04]1.054[0.64]-0.380[ .89]-0.566[0.67]-0.974[0.48]0.570[0.61]0.651[0.77]
D16 (971124: Korea +1)-0.915[0.23]-0.486[0.59]0.888[0.35]0.164[0.81]0.279[0.78]-1.347[0.55]1.597[0.56]-2.506[0.06]-4.429[0.00]-0.494[0.66]1.608[0.10]
D17 (971128: Korea –1) 1.203[0.11]-0.267[0.77]-1.434[0.13]-0.282[0.69]1.469[0.15]-4.020[ .08]0.047[0.99]0.813[0.55]-0.594[0.67]0.008[0.99]1.217[0.27]
D18 (971201: Korea  0)-0.255[0.74]0.059[0.95]0.349[0.71]2.027[0.00]1.003[0.32]-3.453[0.13]0.810[0.77]-1.543[0.26]0.347[0.80]-1.170[ .30]1.315[0.22]
D19 (971202: Korea +1)1.113[0.15]-1.194[0.19]-0.079[0.93]0.217[0.76]-1.560[ .12]6.143[0.01]-2.229[0.42]-2.210[ .11]-1.843[0.18]-2.372[0.04]2.266[0.01]
D20 (971203: Korea –1) -0.286[0.71]0.471[0.61]0.702[0.47]0.533[0.46]0.689[0.51]4.201[0.07]1.851[0.52]1.277[0.36]0.284[0.84]-0.257[0.83]0.713[0.71]
D21 (971204: Korea  0)0.338[0.65]0.170[0.85]0.852[0.36]0.923[0.18]-0.117[0.91]-0.065[0.98]-0.485[0.86]5.528[0.00]-2.078[0.14]-1.580[ .17]2.509[0.01]
D22 (971205: Korea +1)0.442[0.55]2.120[0.02]0.460[0.62]0.077[0.91]0.475[0.63]0.461[0.84]0.208[0.94]0.053[0.97]-2.280[ .10]-2.216[0.05]1.224[0.27]
D23 (971208: Korea +2)1.048[0.16]2.324[0.01]2.220[0.02]0.356[0.61]1.267[0.21]7.314[0.00]5.053[0.07]-4.051[0.00]2.870[0.04]-0.312[0.78]4.435[0.00]
D24 (980107: IMF Nego -1)-0.608[0.42]-0.309[0.73]-3.624[0.00]-1.157[0.10]-1.163[0.24]-2.157[0.33]3.501[0.20]-3.165[0.02]-0.388[0.78]-1.356[0.23]3.269[0.00]
D25 (980108: IMF Nego  0)-0.879[0.24]-1.011[0.26]-2.775[0.00]-1.320[ .06]0.867[0.38]-4.106[0.07]7.200[0.02]-3.245[0.02]-1.236[0.37]-2.203[0.05]3.815[0.00]
D26 (980109: IMF Nego +1)-0.861[0.25]-1.390[ .12]-0.331[0.72]0.595[0.40]0.524[0.60]-3.732[0.09]1.204[0.66]-2.179[0.10]-0.733[0.59]0.541[0.64]1.063[0.39]
D27 (980112: IMF Nego +2)0.243[0.75]-0.815[0.36]-0.750[ .43]-1.477[0.03]-1.096[0.27]0.372[0.87]0.974[0.72]-2.476[0.07]0.630[0.64]1.144[0.31]1.228[0.27]
D28 (980113: IMF Nego +3)0.551[0.46]0.609[0.50]0.605[0.52]0.253[0.72]0.159[0.87]-2.676[0.23]-7.976[0.00]1.812[0.18]2.121[0.12]-0.061[0.96]1.505[0.13]
D29 (980114: IMF Nego +4)0.222[0.77]-0.459[0.60]0.474[0.61]1.248[0.07]1.164[0.24]-1.357[0.54]-6.449[0.02]-2.020[ .14]-4.515[0.00]-1.044[0.36]2.266[0.01]
D30 (980115: IMF Nego +5)-0.209[0.78]-0.085[0.92]0.486[0.60]0.057[0.93]0.154[0.88]0.447[0.84]1.186[0.67]-5.739[0.00]-0.743[0.58]-1.847[0.10]2.161[0.02]
D31 (980116: IMF Nego +6)1.006[0.18]-0.209[0.82]0.190[0.84]-0.068[0.92]0.180[0.86]-2.743[0.22]17.214[0.00]7.419[0.00]-0.662[0.63]1.681[0.13]7.394[0.00]
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Table 6. Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of three US banks’ excess returns around news announcements
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for three US banks’ exce s r turns (Chase, Citicorp, and JP Morgan) over the period from 1/15/97 to 7/15/98 (390 days):
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where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on one of the US bank stocks (from Datastream), and mtR is the corresponding US stock market index return.  Both returns are in
excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit. ktX  includes the daily dollar excess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), and the changes in the 7-day
Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and Euroyen rate.  jtf  is a dummy va iable taking a value of 1/n for the j-th event days sh wn b low, or zero
otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate jD  repr sents a cumulative abnormal return for the j-th event days. W  only reproduce the estimates of jD since th  p rameters estimates
are similar to those of Table 2.  p-values are in brackets. F-tests next to the last column are joint tests across three banks.  The last four columns show the results for the equal-,
value-weighted 3-US bank portfolios, US bank index excluding the 3 banks, and the difference.
Estimates of CARs Chase CiticorpJP MorganF(3, 1047)EW 3 bank
Portfolio
VW 3 bank
Portfolio
Bank index
w/o 3 banks
VW 3 banks –
Index w/o 3
D1 (970514 – 970516: n =3) -3.647[0.14]-0.668[0.85]-0.004[1.00]0.985[0.40]-1.439[0.53]-1.627[0.53]-0.215[0.83]-1.412[0.54]
D2 (970522 – 970526: n =3) 1.229[0.62]0.168[0.96]-0.060[ .98]0.117[0.95]0.446[0.85]0.426[0.87]0.203[0.84]0.223[0.92]
D3 (970618 – 970620: n =3) -0.149[0.95]1.590[0.64]-0.124[0.96]0.128[0.94]0.439[0.85]0.613[0.81]0.529[0.60].084[0.97]
D4 (970626 – 970630: n =3) -2.263[0.36]-0.799[0.82]-3.352[0.19]0.749[0.52]-2.138[0.35]-1.804[0.48]-1.890[0.06]0.086[0.97]
D5 (970701 – 970703: n =3) 2.792[0.26]2.694[0.44]1.643[0.52]0.450[0.72]2.377[0.30]2.620[0.31]1.161[0.25]1.459[0.53]
D6 (970711 – 970715: n =3) -0.486[0.84]-4.225[0.22]-1.533[0.55]0.593[0.62]-2.081[0.36]-2.491[0.33]-1.612[0.11]-0.880[ .70]
D7 (970723 – 970729: n =5) 1.902[0.55]1.526[0.73]4.422[0.19]0.625[0.60]2.617[0.38]2.096[0.53]1.846[0.16]0.250[0.93]
D8 (970804 – 970806: n =3) -2.219[0.37]1.731[0.62]-1.306[0.61]0.771[0.51]-0.598[0.79]-0.189[0.94]0.627[0.53]-0.816[0.72]
D9 (970808 – 970812: n =3) 2.724[0.27]1.786[0.61]0.347[0.89]0.463[0.71]1.619[0.48]1.819[0.48]-0.637[0.53]2.456[0.29]
D10 (970813 – 970815: n =3) 3.775[0.13]2.839[0.42]1.361[0.60]0.784[0.50]2.658[0.25]2.855[0.27]1.475[0.15]1.380[0.55]
D11 (970819 – 970821: n =3) 1.653[0.50]-0.620[ .86]-0.644[0.80]0.344[0.79]0.130[0.95]0.172[0.95]-0.443[0.66]0.615[0.79]
D12 (970919 – 970922: n =2) -0.615[0.76]-0.447[0.87]2.409[0.25]0.790[0.50]0.449[0.81]-0.103[0.96]-0.968[0.24]0.865[0.64]
D13 (971007 – 971009: n =3) 0.465[0.85]0.907[0.79]-1.409[0.58]0.242[0.87]-0.012[1.00]0.294[0.91]-0.871[0.38]1.165[0.61]
D14 (971030 – 971103: n =3) -3.678[0.13]-2.814[0.41]-2.373[0.35]0.785[0.50]-2.955[0.19]-3.044[0.23]-0.662[0.51]-2.382[0.30]
D15 (971104 – 971106: n =3) 1.375[0.58]2.323[0.50]1.993[0.44]0.247[0.86]1.897[0.41]1.833[0.47]0.627[0.53]1.206[0.60]
D16 (971114 – 971118: n =3) -2.894[0.24]-0.113[0.97]-1.951[0.45]0.701[0.55]-1.653[0.47]-1.343[0.60]0.214[0.83]-1.556[0.49]
D17 (971119 – 971124: n =4) 1.640[0.56]-0.894[0.82]0.608[0.84]0.244[0.87]0.451[0.86]0.316[0.91]0.780[0.50]-0.465[0.86]
D18 (971128 – 971202: n =3) 2.857[0.25]4.835[0.16]2.904[0.26]0.796[0.50]3.532[0.12]3.935[0.13]1.124[0.26]2.811[0.22]
D19 (971203 – 971208: n =4) 1.179[0.68]8.380[0.04]0.540[0.86]1.852[0.14]3.366[0.20]4.447[0.13]2.536[0.03]1.911[0.47]
D20 (971212 – 971216: n =3) -1.048[0.67]-0.716[0.83]1.290[0.61]0.280[0.84]-0.158[0.94]-0.503[0.84]0.620[0.53]-1.123[0.62]
D21 (971217 – 971219: n =3) -0.048[0.99]2.180[0.54]1.099[0.68]0.200[0.90]1.077[0.65]1.143[0.66]-0.447[0.66]1.591[0.50]
D22 (971223 – 971226: n =4) 1.303[0.67]-1.647[0.70]-0.611[0.85]0.247[0.86]-0.318[0.91]-0.467[0.88]-0.559[0.65]0.092[0.97]
D23 (971229 – 971231: n =3) -1.516[0.57]-1.763[0.64]-4.438[0.11]0.876[0.45]-2.573[0.30]-2.095[0.45]0.675[0.53]-2.770[ .27]
D24 (980101 – 980105: n =3) 2.789[0.26]2.745[0.42]2.482[0.33]0.525[0.67]2.672[0.24]2.686[0.29]-0.655[0.51]3.341[0.14]
D25 (980108 – 980112: n =3) -1.990[ .42]-3.767[0.27]-4.840[ .06]1.211[0.30]-3.532[0.12]-3.256[0.20]-3.372[0.00].116[0.96]
D26 (980113 – 980114: n =2) -0.928[0.64]2.411[0.39]1.288[0.54]0.716[0.54]0.923[0.62]1.007[0.63]2.062[0.01]-1.055[0.57]
D27 (980115 – 980116: n =2) 0.384[0.85]0.057[0.98]-0.599[0.78]0.070[0.98]-0.053[0.98]0.054[0.98]0.206[0.80]-0.152[0.94]
D28 (980128 – 980130: n =3) 0.122[0.96]-0.141[0.97]-2.714[0.29]0.515[0.67]-0.911[0.69]-0.482[0.85]-0.511[0.61]0.029[0.99]
D29 (980213 – 980218: n =4) 1.327[0.64]-0.680[ .86]0.120[0.97]0.152[0.93]0.256[0.92]0.152[0.96]-0.240[0.83]0.392[0.88]
D30 (980306 – 980310: n = ) -2.397[0.33]-1.815[0.60]-2.592[0.31]0.471[0.70]-2.268[0.32]-2.190[ .39]0.731[0.46]-2.921[0.20]
D31 (980320 – 980323: n =2) -2.349[0.24]-3.149[0.26]-0.541[0.80]0.675[0.57]-2.013[0.28]-2.415[0.24]-1.013[0.21]-1.402[0.45]
D32 (980325 – 980327: n = ) 0.842[0.73]-0.471[0.89]-0.438[0.86]0.107[0.96]-0.023[0.99]-0.025[0.99]-0.670[0.50].645[0.78]
D33 (980407 – 980409: n =3) -3.061[0.21]-7.743[0.03]-2.155[0.40]1.709[0.16]-4.319[0.06]-4.967[0.05]-0.233[0.82]-4.734[0.04]
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Table 7. Estimates of the abnormal returns (ARs) of th e US banks’ excess returns on each day of the IMF program announcements
The following SUR models are estimated in a system for three US banks’ exce s r turns (Chase, Citicorp, and JP Morgan) over the period from 1/15/97 to 7/15/98 (390 days):
t
J
j
jtj
K
k
ktkmtpt DXRR efgba ++++= åå
== 11
,000
where ptR  is the logarithmic daily dollar return on one of the US bank stocks (from Datastream), and mtR is the corresponding US stock market index return.  Both returns are in
excess of one-day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit. ktX  includes the daily dollar excess returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF, and JY), and the changes in the 7-day
Eurodollar rate and the spread between the 7-day Eurodollar rate and EuroYen r te.  jtf  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day sh wn b low, or zero
otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate jD  repr sents an abnormal return for the j-th event day.  We only reproduce the estimates of jD since th  p rameters estimates are similar
to those of Table 2. P-va ues are in brackets.  F-tests next to the last column are joint tests across three banks.  The last four columns show the results for the equal-, value-weighted
3-US bank portfolios, US bank index excluding the 3 banks, and the difference.
Estimates of ARs Chase CiticorpJP MorganF(3, 1053)EW 3 bank
Portfolio
VW 3 bank
Portfolio
Bank index
w/o 3 banks
VW 3 banks –
Index w/o 3
D1 (970711: Philippines –1) 0.301[0.83]-0.724[0.71]0.364[0.80]0.163[0.92]-0.020[ .99]-0.201[0.89]0.163[0.77]-0.365[0.78]
D2 (970714: Philippines  0)-0.270[ .85]0.096[0.96]-1.158[0.42]0.288[0.83]-0.444[0.73]-0.255[0.86]-0.813[0.15]0.558[0.66]
D3 (970715: Philippines +1)-0.373[0.79]-3.435[0.08]-0.550[ .70]1.241[0.29]-1.453[0.26]-1.867[0.20]-0.913[0.11]-0.954[0.46]
D4 (970804: Thailand –1) -1.520[ .27]-0.336[0.86]-0.792[0.58]0.487[0.69]-0.883[0.49]-0.858[0.55]-0.228[0.68]-0.629[0.62]
D5 (970805: Thailand  0)-1.495[0.28]-0.293[0.88]-0.100[ .94]0.487[0.69]-0.630[ .62]-0.712[0.62]0.324[0.57]-1.037[0.42]
D6 (970806: Thailand +1)0.892[0.53]2.523[0.20]-0.438[0.76]0.896[0.44]0.992[0.45]1.498[0.31]0.410[0.47]1.087[0.40]
D7 (970808: Thailand –1) 0.349[0.81]0.465[0.82]-0.607[0.68]0.162[0.92]0.069[0.96]0.204[0.89]-1.013[0.08]1.217[0.36]
D8 (970811: Thailand  0)1.075[0.44]1.388[0.48]2.416[0.09]0.941[0.42]1.626[0.21]1.431[0.32]0.585[0.30]0.846[0.51]
D9 (970812: Thailand +1)1.405[0.31]0.260[0.89]-1.426[0.33]1.163[0.32]0.080[0.95]0.377[0.79]-0.261[0.64]0.638[0.62]
D10 (971030: Indonesia –1) -1.934[0.17]-1.055[0.59]-1.512[0.30]0.762[0.52]-1.500[ .25]-1.447[0.32]-0.224[0.69]-1.223[0.34]
D11 (971031: Indonesia  0)-1.753[0.22]-1.918[0.33]-1.446[0.32]0.620[0.60]-1.706[0.19]-1.804[0.22]-0.097[0.87]-1.708[0.19]
D12 (971103: Indonesia +1)0.046[0.97]0.129[0.95]0.700[0.63]0.094[0.96]0.291[0.82]0.233[0.87]-0.317[0.58]0.549[0.67]
D13 (971119: Korea –2) 3.117[0.03]1.757[0.37]2.779[0.05]2.198[0.09]2.551[0.05]2.468[0.09]0.612[0.28]1.856[0.15]
D14 (971120: Korea –1) -0.883[0.53]-0.682[0.73]-0.961[0.51]0.202[0.90]-0.842[0.51]-0.813[0.57]0.398[0.48]-1.211[0.34]
D15 (971121: Korea  0)0.338[0.81]-0.538[0.78]-0.790[ .59]0.213[0.89]-0.330[ .80]-0.266[0.85]-0.660[ .24]0.394[0.76]
D16 (971124: Korea +1)-0.900[ .52]-1.368[0.49]-0.346[0.81]0.211[0.89]-0.871[0.50]-1.012[0.49]0.440[0.44]-1.451[0.26]
D17 (971128: Korea –1) -0.118[0.93]0.271[0.89]-0.903[0.54]0.201[0.90]-0.250[ .85]-0.094[0.95]-0.104[0.86]0.010[0.99]
D18 (971201: Korea  0)3.646[0.01]5.139[0.01]3.679[0.01]3.418[0.02]4.155[0.00]4.549[0.00]0.779[0.17]3.770[0.00]
D19 (971202: Korea +1)-0.955[0.50]-0.903[0.65]-0.098[0.95]0.188[0.90]-0.652[0.62]-0.813[0.58]0.494[0.39]-1.307[0.32]
D20 (971203: Korea –1) 0.383[0.79]0.760[0.71]-0.661[0.66]0.232[0.87]0.160[0.90]0.361[0.81]0.932[0.11]-0.571[0.67]
D21 (971204: Korea  0)1.833[0.19]4.701[0.02]2.295[0.11]2.054[0.10]2.943[0.02]3.269[0.02]0.897[0.11]2.372[0.06]
D22 (971205: Korea +1)-0.903[0.52]1.658[0.40]0.679[0.64]0.822[0.48]0.478[0.71]0.582[0.69]0.089[0.88]0.493[0.70]
D23 (971208: Korea +2)0.023[0.99]1.450[0.46]-1.665[0.25]1.115[0.34]-0.064[0.96]0.411[0.78]0.510[0.37]-0.100[ .94]
D24 (980107: IMF Nego -1)1.502[0.28]-0.214[0.91]1.183[0.41]0.723[0.54]0.823[0.52]0.632[0.66]-2.143[0.00]2.776[0.03]
D25 (980108: IMF Nego  0)-3.183[0.02]-2.570[ .19]-2.836[0.05]2.141[0.09]-2.863[0.03]-2.810[ .05]-1.310[ .02]-1.501[0.24]
D26 (980109: IMF Nego +1)1.329[0.35]2.065[0.30]1.350[0.36]0.493[0.69]1.581[0.22]1.646[0.26]-0.736[0.20]2.382[0.07]
D27 (980112: IMF Nego +2)-0.228[0.87]-3.276[0.09]-3.408[0.02]2.568[0.05]-2.304[0.07]-2.139[0.14]-1.384[0.01]-0.755[0.56]
D28 (980113: IMF Nego +3)-0.692[0.62]-0.887[0.65]2.096[0.15]1.444[0.23]0.173[0.89]-0.323[0.82]0.935[0.10]-1.258[0.33]
D29 (980114: IMF Nego +4)-0.132[0.92]3.377[0.08]-0.685[0.63]1.905[0.13]0.854[0.50]1.428[0.32]1.164[0.04]0.264[0.84]
D30 (980115: IMF Nego +5)-0.309[0.82]0.105[0.96]-0.443[0.76]0.061[0.98]-0.216[0.87]-0.164[0.91]-0.331[0.56]0.166[0.90]
D31 (980116: IMF Nego +6)0.780[0.58]0.059[0.98]-0.082[0.95]0.154[0.93]0.253[0.84]0.307[0.83]0.522[0.36]-0.215[0.87]
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Figure 1. Banking industry indices by country for the period from 1/15/97 (=100 U$) to 7/15/98.
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Figure 2. Stock market and banking industry indices for Asian countries from 1/15/97 (=100 U$) to 7/15/98
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